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STATEMENT QF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(4) (2002), transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Consequently,

the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

is

conferred

with

jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (2002) .

STATEMENT QF ISSUES / STANDARDS QF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred by deeming trespassers to

be members of the public whose use could and did ripen into a
public way.
whether

"When reviewing a trial court's decision regarding

a public

appellate

court]

highway
review[s]

has

been

the

established

decision

for

.

.

.,

correctness

[the
but

grant[s] the court significant discretion in its application of
the facts to the statute."
307, 310 (Utah 1997).

Heber

City

Corp.

v. Simpson,

942 P. 2d

However, the trial court's application of

the law is a legal determination reviewed for correction of error.
State

v.

Pena,

869 P. 2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) (when reviewing "a

trial court's determination of the law[,] . . . [an] appellate
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any
degree to the trial judge's determination of law"); see
Corp.

v.

Simonsen,

2005 UT App 176, 1[8.

6

also

AWINC

Preservation

of Issue Citation

or Statement

of Grounds for

R&vjw.

Trial counsel, among other citations set forth in the record on
appeal, preserved this issue by way of the continuing objection
and

arguments

set

forth

in the

record

in

passim

and

at

R.

1646:1197-98, et seg.
2.
the

Whether the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied

law

of

continuous

use

as

it

pertains

to

dedication

by

concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been continuously used
by the public.
whether

a

appellate

"When reviewing a trial court's decision regarding

public
court]

highway
review[s]

has

been

the

established

decision

for

.

.

. ,

correctness

[the
but

grant[s] the court significant discretion in its application of
the facts to the statute."
307, 310 (Utah 1997).

Heber

City

Corp.

v. Simpson,

942 P.2d

Nevertheless, the trial court's application

of the law is a legal determination reviewed for correction of
error.

State

v. Pena,

869 P. 2d 932, 935-36

(Utah 1994)

(when

reviewing "a trial court's determination of the law[,] . . . [an]
appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer
in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law"); see
also

AWINC

Corp.

v.

Simonsen,

2005

UT

App

176,

\8.

To

successfully challenge a finding, the appellant "must marshal the
evidence in support of the finding[] and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial court's finding[] [is] so lacking
7

in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence, '
thus making [it] 'clearly erroneous.'"

Valcarce

v.

Fitzgerald,

961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted).

Preservation

of Issue Citation

or Statement

of Grounds for Review:

Trial counsel, among other citations set forth in the record on
appeal, preserved this issue by way of the continuing objection
and

arguments

1646:1222, et
3.

set

forth

in the

in

record

passim

and

at

R.

seq.

Whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by

failing to specifically identify the requisite ten-year period of
time as dictated by the dedication statute.

"When reviewing a

trial court's decision regarding whether a public highway has been
established . . ., [the appellate court] review[s] the decision
for correctness but grant[s] the court significant discretion in
its application of the facts to the statute."

Heber

City

Simpson,

The

trial

942

P.2d

307, 310

(Utah 1997).

Corp.

v.

court's

application or interpretation of the law is a legal determination
reviewed for correction of error.

State

v.

Pena,

869 P.2d 932,

935-36 (Utah 1994) (when reviewing "a trial court's determination
of the law[,] . . . [an] appellate court decides the matter for
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's
determination of law"); see

also

AWINC Corp.

App 176, %8.
8

v.

Simonsen,

2005 UT

Preservation

of Issue

Citation

or Statement

of Grounds

for

Review:

Trial counsel, among other citations set forth in the record on
appeal, preserved this issue by way of the continuing objection
and

arguments

set

forth

in the

record

in

passim

and

at

R.

1646:1200:8-15, et seg.
4.

The trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule

on Defendants' Objections

to

Conclusions of Law, and Order.

the proposed

Findings

of Fact,

An appellate court reviews a trial

court's ruling on a post-trial motion or objection to proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for abuse of
See Child

discretion.
State v. Pena,

v.

Gonda,

972 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah 1998);

869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994) ("At the extreme end

of the discretion spectrum would be a decision by the trial court
to grant

or deny a new trial based on insufficiency

of the

evidence.") .
Preservation

of Issue

Citation

or Statement

of Grounds

for

Review:

Trial counsel, among other citations set forth in the record on
appeal, preserved this issue by way of the filing of an Objection
to the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order as
set forth in the record at R. 1480-86.

9

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative,
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellants.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves critical questions concerning the required
elements for dedication and abandonment of a road to the use of
the public.

In this case, the trial court misinterpreted and

misapplied the law in the course of rendering its decision.
In October 2000, Plaintiffs, Utah County and the State of
Utah,

sued

closure

of

enrichment.

Defendants,
a

public

as property
road

and

owners,

easement

as

alleging
well

as

illegal
unjust

In conjunction, Plaintiffs sought a determination by

the court that the route described as the Bennie Creek Road be
deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the
public pursuant to statute.

Plaintiffs moved for a temporary

restraining order, which the district court denied.

Defendants

denied the allegations concerning dedication and abandonment of
the road.
Pursuant to an agreement to mediate the case, the parties
appeared for mediation, at the conclusion of which a "Settlement

10

Agreement" was executed.

Sometime thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a

Motion and Memorandum to Enforce Settlement Agreement, to which
Defendants responded in opposition.
The district court subsequently signed an Order approving a
stipulation

between

Defendants

Margaret

Condley,

Michael

E.

Condley, and Elizabeth Condley and dismissing them with prejudice
from the lawsuit.
The parties, on February 2, 2004, appeared for an evidentiary
hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement,
which the district court denied, requested further briefing, and
set the case for trial. After supplemental briefing, the district
court

again

determined

the

Settlement

Agreement

to

be

unenforceable.
The remaining parties appeared before the district court over
the course of several days for a bench trial in June 2004.

On

June 16, 2004, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision,
concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been dedicated and
abandoned to the use of the public.
Plaintiff's

counsel

submitted proposed

Conclusions of Law, and Order.

Findings of Fact,

Defendants filed an Objection to

the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and
requested

oral

argument

on

the

Plaintiffs opposed the request

objections.

In

response,

for oral argument and, in the

11

alternative, requested an expedited hearing

in addition to a

request for attorney fees.

Plaintiffs, on August 16, 2004, also

filed

for Decision.

a Notice

to Submit

That

same day, the

district court signed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order, which were entered that same day.
In their Verified Memorandum of Costs, Plaintiffs requested
that the district court award them "on half [sic] of the cost for
the mediator for a total of $650.00", in addition to $74.00 for
witness fees for four witnesses utilized by Plaintiffs during the
hearing

on

Defendants

their

Motion

to

again objected.

Enforce

Settlement

Plaintiffs responded

Agreement.
and filed a

Notice to Submit for Decision.
Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans and Linda
Evans, through counsel, on September 15, 2 0 04, filed Notice of
Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
By way of Order, the district court awarded the costs of suit
requested by Plaintiffs.
The Utah Supreme Court subsequently transferred the appeal to
the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
On September 27, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of CrossAppeal to the Utah Supreme Court from paragraph 6 of the district
court's Order.

12

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In October 2 000, Utah County and the State of Utah, as

Plaintiffs, sued Randy and Donna Butler, as property owners,
alleging illegal closure of a public road and easement as well as
unjust

enrichment

Plaintiffs
described

sought
as

the

(R.
a

1-12).

As

judicial

Bennie

Creek

of

their

determination

that

Road

part

be

deemed

Complaint,
the

to

have

route
been

dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 72-5-1041 and its predecessor statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 27-12-89 (R. 6 ) .
2.

In conjunction with the Complaint, Utah County and the

State of Utah moved for a temporary restraining order (R. 96-98) ,
which the district court denied (R. 118-20).
3.

By

Answer,

the

Butlers

specifically

denied

the

allegations underlying the request for dedication and abandonment
of the road (R. 125-30) .
4.

Pursuant to motion and order, Utah County and the State

of Utah subsequently amended their Complaint to include other
pertinent property owners and John Does claiming an interest in
the Bennie Creed Road (R. 186-99) .

^ e e Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2001), a true and correct copy
of which is attached hereto as Addendum A.
13

5.

All the Defendants thereafter answered and specifically

denied the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint (R. 26877) .
6.

During a pretrial

conference on July 17, 2002, the

parties agreed to mediate the case (R. 830-31) .
7.

On August

20, 2002,

a mediation was held before a

mediator, at the conclusion of which a "Settlement Agreement" was
executed (R. 1005) .
8.

Thereafter, on April 2, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Motion

and Memorandum to Enforce Settlement Agreement

(R. 895-1006).

Defendants responded in opposition to the Motion (R. 1066-74).
9.
approving

On October 1, 2003, the district court signed an Order
a

stipulation

between

Defendants

Margaret

Condley,

Michael E. Condley, and Elizabeth Condley and dismissing them with
prejudice from the lawsuit (R. 1201-18).
10.

On

February

2,

2004,

the

parties

appeared

for

an

evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement,
after

which

the

district

court

denied

Plaintiffs'

Motion,

requested further briefing, and set the case for trial (R. 128589) .
11.
parties,

On April 27, 2004, after supplemental briefing by the
the

district

court

again

determined

Agreement to be unenforceable (R. 13 72).
14

the

Settlement

12.

The remaining parties appeared before the district court

over the course of several days for a bench trial in June 2 004 (R.
1442-55) .
13.

On June 16, 2004, the district court issued a Memorandum

Decision, concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been dedicated
and abandoned to the use of the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 72-5-104 and its predecessor statute, Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89
(R. 1456-73) .

See Memorandum Decision, R. 1456-73, a true and

correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum B.
14.

Thereafter,

Plaintiff's

counsel

submitted

proposed

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (R. 1507).
15.

Defendants filed an Objection to the proposed Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and requested oral argument
on the objections

(R. 1480-86).

See Defendants' Objection to

Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order and Request

for Oral Argument, R.

14 80-86, a true and

correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum C.
16.

Plaintiffs

responded

to

Defendants'

Objection

and

opposed the request for oral argument and, in the alternative,
requested an expedited hearing in addition to their request for
attorney
Objection

fees
to

(R.

1486-1503).

Plaintiffs'

Proposed

See

Response

Findings

of

to Defendants'
Fact

an

[sic]

Conclusions of Law and Request for Oral Argument; Objection to
15

Request for Oral Argument, or in the Alternative, Request for
Expedited Hearing; Request for Attorney's Fees, R. 1486-1503, a
true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum D.
17.

With their response, Plaintiffs, on August 16, 2004,

filed a Notice to Submit for Decision (R. 1504-06) .
18.

That same day, the district court signed the Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, which were entered that same
day (R. 1507-26).

See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Order, R. 1507-26, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum E.
19.

Plaintiffs thereafter filed a Verified Memorandum of

Costs, requesting, among other things, that the district court
award Plaintiffs "on half [sic] of the cost for the mediator for
a total of $650.00", in addition to $74.00 for witness fees for
four witnesses utilized by Plaintiffs during the hearing on their
Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement (R. 1527-29) .
20.
suit

Defendants filed an Objection to the proposed costs of

(R. 1530-34).

Plaintiffs responded and filed a Notice to

Submit for Decision (R. 1535-1616; R. 1617-19).
21.

Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans, and

Linda Evans, through counsel, on September 15, 2004, filed Notice
of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 1620-23).
Notice of Appeal, attached hereto as Addendum F.
16

See R. 1620-23,

22.

By way of Order, dated September 20, 2004, the district

court awarded the costs of suit requested by Plaintiffs (R. 162427) .
23.

On

September

23,

2004,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

transferred the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
24.

On September 27, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of

Cross-Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from paragraph 6 of the
district court's Order (R. 1630-31).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial

court erred by deeming trespassers

to be

members of the public whose use could and did ripen into a public
way.

Trespassers are not members of the public for purposes of

dedication and abandonment of private property for public use.
The totality of the circumstances in the instant case demonstrates
that

most

trespassers.
of

the

of

the

witnesses

utilized

by

Plaintiffs'

were

As such, those witnesses did not constitute members

public

for

purposes

of

establishing

dedication

and

abandonment of the Bennie Creek Road for the public use pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104.

By refusing to apply common law

trespass to the elements of dedication set forth in Utah Code Ann.

17

§ 72-5-104, the trial court misinterpreted the requisite elements
as they applied to the instant case.
By refusing to apply common law trespassing principles to the
requisite elements of dedication, the trial court impermissibly
relieved Plaintiffs of their burden to prove dedication by clear
and

convincing

evidence

and

thereby

shifted

the

Defendants, as property owners, to prove otherwise.

burden

to

Further, the

trial court's refusal to apply the law of trespass ignored the
well-established presumption to be employed in favor of property
owners, which is due to the high-degree of sanctity and respect of
property ownership.
2.

The

trial

court

misinterpreted

and

misapplied

the

underlying law of "continuous use" as it pertains to dedication by
concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been continuously used
by

the

public.

misinterpreted
underlying

Utah

In

the

instant

Code Ann.

case,

§ 72-5-104

the

trial

court

and misapplied

legal principles of the statute pertaining

the

to the

elements of "continuous use" as a "public thoroughfare" when it
determined that the Bennie Creek Road was in continuous use by the
public as a public thoroughfare.
3.

The trial court erred, as a matter of law, by failing to

specifically identify the requisite ten-year period of time as
dictated by the dedication statute.
18

By failing to specifically

pinpoint a 10-year period of time as required by the dedication
statute, the trial court misinterpreted the statute and thereby
impermissibly
landowners.
presumption

shifted

the burden of

proof

to Defendants, as

This failure by the trial court also ignored the
to

be

employed

in

favor

of

the

Defendants,

as

landowners.
4.
on

The trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule

Defendants'

objections

to

Conclusions of Law, and Order.

the proposed

Findings

of Fact,

By failing to specifically rule on

Defendants' substantial objections, which challenged the proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, for, among other
things, insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court abused its
discretion.

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DEEMING TRESPASSERS
TO BE MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC WHOSE USE COULD
AND DID RIPEN INTO A PUBLIC WAY.
A.

Legal Principles Surrounding Dedication
and Abandonment to the Use of the
Public.

Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104

(2001) provides, "A highway is

dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten
years."

See

Utah

Code

Ann.

19

§

72-5-104(1)

(2001).

Notwithstanding, w[t]he law does not lightly allow the transfer of
Draper

property from private to public use."
Bernardo,

City

v.

Estate

of

888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995).

The taking of property in circumstances such as that in the
instant case "requires proof of dedication by clear and convincing
evidence."

Id.

(citing Thomson

v.

Condas,

493 P.2d 639, 639 (1972); Petersen v.
78, 438 P.2d 545, 548 (1968)).

2 7 Utah 2d 12 9, 13 0,

Combe,

20 Utah 2d 376, 377-

"This higher standard of proof is

demanded since the ownership of property should be granted a high
degree of sanctity and respect."

Id.

(citing Petersen, 438 P.2d

at 548-49 (Crockett, C.J., dissenting)).
Additionally, "x [t]he presumption is in favor of the property
owner; and the burden of establishing public use for the required
period of time is on those claiming it.'"
v.

Pine

Bonner

Meadow Ranches,
v.

Sudbury,

Leo M. Bertagnole,

639 P.2d 211, 213

Inc.

(Utah 1981) (quoting

18 Utah 2d 140, 143, 417 P.2d 646, 648 (1966)).

Under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, "'the highway, even though it be
over privately owned ground, will be deemed dedicated or abandoned
to the public use when the public has continuously used it as a
thoroughfare for a period of 10 years, but such
public.'"
723

Thompson

v.

Nelson,

(1954) (quoting Morris

use must

be by

the

2 Utah 2d 340, 345, 273 P. 2d 720,
v.

Blunt,

1127, 1131 (1916)).
20

49 Utah 243, 251, 161 P.

B.

Trespassers Are Not Members of the
Public for Purposes of Dedication and
Abandonment of Private Property for
Public Use.

The record in the instant case demonstrates, at the very
least, that a substantial number of Plaintiffs' witnesses utilized
at trial were trespassers on Defendants' property (see, e.g., R.
1639:39:7-12; R. 1639:55:9-12; R. 1639:71-72; R. 1640:232-33; R.
1640:287:3-7; R. 1640:347:4-21; R. 1640:378:16-21; R. 1641:509:917; R. 1642:709:16).

The landowners, among other things, posted

"no trespassing" signs (see, e.g.,

id.),

placed gates across the

road (see, e.g., R. 1642:710:18), and called the county sheriff to
have the trespassers removed (see, e.g.,

R. 1645:1073:11-17).

According to common law trespass, "[t]he essential element of
trespass

is physical

possessory action.'"

invasion of
Walker

Drug Co.,

Inc.

v.

P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) (quoting John
Utah State

Conf.,

Bricklayers

Locals

Nos.

1214 (Utah 1980) and citing Restatement
(1977)); see also

Wood v.

Myrup,

x

the land;

[t]respass

La Sal

Price

Oil

Assocs.,

1, 2 & 6,

is a

Co.,
Inc.

972
v.

615 P.2d 1210,

(Second) of Torts § 158

681 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1984).

Trespass is a "wrongful entry . . . upon the lands of another."
See O'Neill

v. San Pedro,

L.A.

& S.L.R.

P. 127, 128 (1911).

21

Co.,

38 Utah 475, 479, 114

The totality of the aforementioned circumstances demonstrates
that

most

trespassers.
of

the

of

the

witnesses

utilized

by

Plaintiffs'

were

As such, those witnesses did not constitute members

public

for

purposes

of

establishing

dedication

and

abandonment of the Bennie Creek Road for the public use pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104.

By refusing to apply common law

trespass to the elements of dedication set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 72-5-104, the trial court misinterpreted the requisite elements
as they applied to the instant case.
C.

By Refusing to Apply Common Law Trespass
Principles to the Requisite Elements of
Dedication, the Trial Court Not Only
Impermissibly Relieved Plaintiffs of
Their
Burden
But
It
Ignored
the
Presumption to be Employed in Favor of
Property Owners.

According to well-established legal principles underlying the
dedication and abandonment of private property to the public use,
the Plaintiffs had the burden to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that those traveling the Bennie Creek Road were not
trespassers.

Draper

City

1099 (Utah 1995); Campbell

v. Estate
v.

of

Box Elder

Bernardo,
County,

888 P. 2d 1097,
962 P.2d 806, 808

(Utah Ct. App. 1998) . By refusing to apply common law trespassing
principles to the requisite elements of dedication, the trial
court impermissibly relieved Plaintiffs of their burden to prove
dedication by clear and convincing evidence and thereby shifted
22

the burden to Defendants, as property owners, to prove otherwise.
Further, the trial court's refusal to apply the law of trespass
ignored the well-established presumption to be employed in favor
of property owners, which is due to the high-degree of sanctity
and respect of property ownership.
1099; Campbell,

II.

Cf.

Draper

City,

888 P.2d at

962 P.2d at 808.

THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPLIED
THE UNDERLYING LAW OF "CONTINUOUS USE" AS IT
PERTAINS TO DEDICATION BY CONCLUDING THAT THE
BENNIE CREEK ROAD HAD BEEN CONTINUOUSLY USED
BY THE PUBLIC.

Three

elements

or

factors

must

be

proven

by

clear

and

convincing evidence for a private road to be dedicated for public
use pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104:

'"there must be (i)

continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period
of ten years.'"

Campbell

(Utah Ct. App. 1998)

v. Box Elder

(quoting Heber

P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997)).

County,
City

Corp.

962 P.2d 806, 808
v.

Simpson,

942

For the "continuous use" element to

be properly established, the public must have "made a continuous
and uninterrupted use . . . as often as they found it convenient
or necessary."

Boyer

v.

Clark,

7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107, 109

(1958).

"[U]se may be continuous though not constant

provided

it

chose

to pass.

occurred

as often

as the claimant

had occasion

Mere intermission is not interruption."

23

. . . .

or

Richards

v.

Pines

omitted).

Ranch,

Inc.,

559 P.2d 948, 949

In summary,

(Utah 1977)

(citation

"under the continuous use requirement,

members of the public must have been able to use the road whenever
they found it necessary or convenient."

Campbell,

962 P. 2d at

809.
The trial court, in the instant case, acknowledged that use
of the Bennie Creek Road was interrupted "by naturally occurring
conditions such as groundwater
snow

in the winter."

conceded

(spring water) in wet years and

(R. 1470).

in its Memorandum

Moreover,

Decision

that

the

trial

witnesses

at

court
trial

testified "that there were locked gates on the road." (R. 1469).
In fact, the trial court mentioned that "[t]here was testimony
regarding four

gates

on the Benny [sic] Creek road between U.S.

Highway 89 and the Uintah National Forest." (R. 1465) (Emphasis
added).

More pointedly, the trial court stated, "Virgil Neeves

testified that between 1958 and 1980 there was a locked gate near
the Gardner home (the last home traveling west toward the forest
service property, now occupied by Defendant Randy Butler) which
was locked most of the time." (R. 1467-68).2

2

The trial court also noted that Mr. Neeves "saw people stuck on
the road and recalls a cable across the road to stop cars."
The
trial court, however, without explanation, refused to consider this
testimonial evidence, deeming it as "simply confused and inconsistent
with all of the other testimony about obstructions on the road in
question." (R. 1468).
24

Additionally, the trial court, in its Memorandum Decision,
specifically noted that Mr. Mike Condley, who had lived in the
area from 1970 until 1979, "firmly recalled a locked gate near the
Gardner

(Butler) home."

(R. 1468).

Shortly thereafter in its

Decision, the trial court also acknowledged that Defendant Blaine
Evans and others put the locked gates farther west, near the
present cattle guard between the Butler home and forest service
property." (R. 1467).
In addition to the gates, the trial court conceded that there
"was substantial testimony about

["no trespassing"] signs along

the road" and other locations "designating the area as private
property." (R. 1466; see also

R. 1639:39:7-12; R. 1639:55:9-12; R.

1639:71-72; R. 1640:232-33; R. 1640:287:3-7; R. 1640:347:4-21; R.
1640:378:16-21; R. 1641:509:9-17; R. 1642:709:16).
Defendants,

as landowners, called

the county

Further, the

sheriff

to have

various individuals removed from their property, as trespassers
(see, e.g., R. 1645:1073:11-17; see also

R. 1466).

Travel to the Forest Service land by way of the Bennie Creek
Road was also precluded by what was commonly referred to as a bog
in the road, which was the result of springs or ditches (R. 1462) .
This bog, according to the record, made travel on the Bennie Creek
Road difficult, if not impossible, during

"certain seasons or

certain times between 1925 and 1980" (R. 1462) .
25

Finally, the unrebutted testimony at trial established that
the road "is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to
property along

the road and that when that occurs, the road

becomes impassable." (R. 1466) .3 According to testimony, the road
was used

from

1950

through

1993

as the

irrigation

ditch to

transport water to the property owners' pastures on both sides of
the road (R. 1644:944:17-25; R. 1644:970:6-9).

The testimony at

trial established that "about every three weeks" the road would be
utilized for irrigation purposes "[f]or approximately six days" at
a time (R. 1644:974:11-20).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court found that
"neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used
that method or irrigation covering a period from 1925 to 1981."
(R. 1466; R. 1518, fl8). To successfully challenge a finding, the
appellant "must marshal the evidence in support of the finding []
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
finding [] [is] so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear
weight of the evidence,' thus making [it] 'clearly erroneous.'"
Valcarce
omitted).

v.

Fitzgerald,
There

aforementioned

961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1997) (citations
is

no

finding.

evidence

to

marshal

in

support

of

Thus, in light of the aforementioned

3

The irrigation practices of the landowners were performed
pursuant to "diligence rights" established in 1850 (R. 1645:1093:14) .
26

testimony and citations to the record, the trial court's finding
is clearly erroneous.
The trial court, in the instant case, misinterpreted Utah
Code

Ann.

principles

§
of

72-5-104
the

and

statute

misapplied
pertaining

the
to

underlying
the

legal

elements

of

"continuous use" as a "public thoroughfare" when it determined
that the Bennie Creek Road was in continuous use by the public as
a public thoroughfare.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BY
FAILING
TO
SPECIFICALLY
IDENTIFY
THE
REQUISITE TEN-YEAR PERIOD OF TIME AS DICTATED
BY THE DEDICATION STATUTE.
Continuous use by the public for ten years is required before
private property can be dedicated or abandoned to the public use.
See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1)
County,

(2001); Campbell

962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

v.

Box

Elder

The trial court,

in the instant case, failed to specifically identify such a tenyear period of time.
In the case at bar, the trial court concluded that "the
evidence is clear and convincing that for at least 10 years prior
to 1958 the road was open and traveled by the public as often as
necessary or convenient

. . . ."

stated that

27

(R. 1470).

The trial court

even if it is concluded (which this Court
does not) that the road was gated and locked
in the late 50's and early 60's as described
by the Butlers, the road was used as
necessary and convenient by the public for
more than 10 years before that time and,
again, 10 years after that time."
(R. 1461; see also

R. 1515, 1f2 8) .

By failing to specifically pinpoint a 10-year period of time
as

required

by

the

dedication

statute,

the

trial

court

misinterpreted the statute and thereby impermissibly shifted the
burden of proof to Defendants, as landowners.

This failure by the

trial court also ignored the presumption to be employed in favor
of the Defendants, as landowners.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
FAILING TO RULE ON DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO
THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND ORDER.

The trial court's ruling on a post-trial motion or objection
to proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.

See

425, 428 (Utah 1998); State v.

869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994)

("At

the extreme

end

Pena,

Child

of the discretion

v.

Gonda,

spectrum

972 P.2d

would be a

decision by the trial court to grant or deny a new trial based on
insufficiency of the evidence.").
On June 16, 2 004, the district court issued a Memorandum
Decision, concluding that the Bennie Creek Road had been dedicated
28

and abandoned to the use of the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 72-5-104 and its predecessor statute, Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89.
Thereafter, Plaintiff's counsel submitted proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
Defendants filed an Objection to the proposed Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and requested oral argument on
the objections.

Plaintiffs responded to Defendants' Objection and

opposed the request for oral argument and, in the alternative,
requested an expedited hearing in addition to their request for
attorney fees.

With their response, Plaintiffs, on August 16,

2004, filed a Notice to Submit for Decision.

Nevertheless, the

district court, that same day, without hearing or explanation,
signed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, which
were entered that same day.
The

trial

specifically

court

rule

on

abused

its

discretion

Defendants'

by

substantial

failing

to

objections

challenging the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order, for, among other things, insufficiency of the evidence.

CONCLUSION
Based

on

the

foregoing,

Defendants

Randy

Butler,

Donna

Butler, Blaine Evans, and Linda Evans, respectfully request that
this Court reverse the trial court's determination that Bennie

29

Creek Road was dedicated and abandoned to the public use and
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this Court's instructions as set forth in its
opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day o^June, 2005.
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I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to each of
the following on this 17th day of June, 2005:
Mr. M. Cort Griffin
Mr. Robert J. Moore
Deputy Utah County Attorneys
100 East Center Street, Suite 2400
Provo, UT 84606
Counsel for Utah CountyMr. Martin B. Bushman
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ADDENDA
Addendum A
Addendum B
Addendum C

Addendum D:

Addendum E:
Addendum F:

Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2001)
Memorandum Decision
Defendants' Objection
to Plaintiffs'
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order and Request for Oral
Argument
Response to Defendants' Objection to
Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact an
[sic] Conclusions of Law and Request for
Oral Argument; Objection to Request for
Oral Argument, or in the Alternative,
Request for Expedited Hearing; Request
for Attorney's Fees
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order
Notice of Appeal

32

Tab A

RIGHTS-OF-WAY

72-5-104

(b) If the highway is a county road, city street under joint title as
provided in Subsection 72-3-104(3), or right-of-way described in Title 72,
Chapter 5, Part 3, Rights-of-way Across Federal Lands Act, title to all
interests in real property less than fee simple held under this section is
held jointly by the state and the county, city, or town holding the interest.
(3) A transfer of land bounded by a highway on a right-of-way for which the
public h a s only an easement passes the title of the person whose estate is
transferred to the middle of the highway.
History: L. 1963, c h . 39, § 101; 1991, ch.
137, § 29; C. 1953, 27-12-101; r e n u m b e r e d
by L. 1998, c h . 270, § 131; 2000, ch. 324, § 6;
2001, ch. 79, § 2.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §
27-12-101, and added new Subsection (1), making related changes in subsection designation.

The 2000 amendment, effective March 16,
2000, added Subsection (2Kb), making a related
change.
The 2001 amendment, effective March 9,
2001, added Subsections (2)(aXii) and (2)(a)(iii)
and the (2)(a)(i) designation and substituted
"transportation purposes" for "highway purposes" in Subsections (1) and (2)(a)(i).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Rights of public and abutting owners.
Vacation of road.
Cited.
Rights of p u b l i c and a b u t t i n g o w n e r s .
Erection of electric power lines on public
highway right-of-way, the fee to which is not in
the public but in the owner of the abutting
property, is within the purview of the easement
for highway purposes and is not an additional
servitude for which the abutting owner is entitled to compensation. Pickett v. California
Pac. Utils., 619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980).
Statutes regulating water mains in relation
to highways clearly indicated t h a t legislature
did not regard dedication of a street in a platted
subdivision as the surrender of an easement
with retention of the fee in the abutting owner.
White v. Salt Lake City, 121 Utah 134, 239 P.2d
210(1952).
Vacation of road.
When city vacated street property which was

never used by the public and never platted as a
street on the official records, the parties owning
the land abutting on either side of such property were entitled to fee simple interests to the
center line of the "street," because the grantor
who deeded the street property to the city was
also the grantor of the abutting landowners,
and no intention to the contrary appeared in
any of the original deeds. Fenton v. Cedar
Lumber & Hdwe. Co., 17 Utah 2d 99, 404 P.2d
966 (1965).
Property developers' dedication of land for
public rights-of-way in a plat of a subdivision
gave a defeasible fee interest to the county in
the land dedicated for the road and, once the
county vacated the road, the abutting property
owner succeeded to the fee simple title of that
land. Falula Farms, Inc. v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d
569 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Cited in Nelson v. Provo City, 2000 UT App
205, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 20.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways,
Streets, and Bridges § 183.

C.J.S. — 39A C.J.S. Highways § 136.

72-5-104. Public use constituting dedication — Scope.
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it
has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years.
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by the
state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103.
599
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(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary
to ensure safe travel according to the f&cts and circumstances.
History: L. 1963, c h . 39, § 89; C. 1953,
27-12-89; r e n u m b e r e d by L. 1998, c h . 270,
§ 132; 2000, c h . 324, § 7.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1998 amendment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §
27-12-89.

The 2000 amendment, effective March 16
2000, substituted "is" for "shall be deemed ta
have been" in Subsection (1) and added Subsections (2) and (3).

NOTES TO PECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Acceptance.
Burden of proof.
Change in highway
Control by landowners.
Estoppel.
Evidence.
Generally.
Intent of landowner.
—Necessary.
—Not necessary.
Private rights.
"Public" defined.
Rights granted to public.
Rights of subsequent grantees.
Sufficiency of proof of dedication.
"TlvoYQMghfaxe" a n d "puhlvc thoroughfare" distinguished.
Width of roadway.
Acceptance.
When owner of land deeded it to city for
public use but city never accepted it, no dedication took place and claim of purchaser from city
was invalid as against subsequent purchaser
from original owner of land. William J. Lemp
Brewing Co. v. P.J. Moran, Inc., 51 Utah 178,
169 P. 459 (1917).
B u r d e n of proof.
Where claim is made that a highway has
been dedicated to public use, there is a presumption in favor of the property owner and
the burden of establishing public use for the
required period of time is on those claiming it.
Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow
Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981).
Change in highway.
A public highway over public lands is established, although there has been no official acceptance, when it h a s been used for longer than
ten years; if travel h a s remained substantially
unchanged^ and practical identity of road preserved, t h a t is sufficient, although there may
have been slight deviations from the common
way. Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v.
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 (1929).

Slight change in course of highway or of its
location that does not materially change or
affect the general course thereof or affect its
location, nor break or change the continuity of
travel or use, does not constitute abandonment
or affect public nature of highway. Sullivan v.
Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954 (1930).
Control by l a n d o w n e r s .
No dedication was shown under identically
worded predecessor section where it appeared
that an alleyway which had more or less been
used by the public at will for a number of years
had from time to time been closed by the
abutting owners, who had at all times exercised
control over it. Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27
Utah 252, 75 P. 620 (1904).
Estoppel.
Municipality may be estopped from asserting
dedication by acts and conduct that have been
relied on by others to their prejudice and,
likewise, private individual may be estopped in
the same way where he stands by and permits
others to improve land claimed to have been
dedicated. Premium Oil Co. v. Cedar City, 112
Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947).
Evidence.
Evidence showing, among other things, that
roadwa}' was used continuously for recreational
and agricultural purposes and for access to
other business activities supported the trial
court's ruling t h a t the roadway was dedicated
or abandoned to the public. Kohler v. Martin,
916 P.2d 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Generally.
Where all three elements under this section
for the establishment of a public highway were
satisfied, the court had no discretion to ignore
that fact and erred in concluding t h a t a road
was not a public highway. Heber City Corp. v.
Simpson, 942 P.2d 307 (Utah 1997).
Intent. *>i

tandowrax.

—Necessary.
In order for a private road to become a public
thoroughfare there must be evidence of intent
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by the owner to dedicate the road to a public
use and an acceptance by the public. Such
intent may be inferred from declarations, acts
or circumstances and use by the general public.
Gillmor v. Carter, 15 Utah 2d 280, 391 P.2d 426
(1964) (but see cases noted under "—Not necessary" below).
For cases discussing landowner's intent to
dedicate road to public use, see Wilson v. Hull,
7 Utah 90, 24 P. 799 (1890); Whittaker v.
Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 P. 980 (1898);
Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955
(1901); Culmer v. Salt Lake City, 27 Utah 252,
75 P. 620 (1904); Brown v. Oregon Short Line
R.R., 36 Utah 257, 102 P. 740 (1909); Morris v.
Blunt, 49 Utah 243,161 P. 1127 (1916); William
J. Lemp Brewing Co. v. P.J. Moran, Inc., 51
Utah 178, 169 P. 459 (1917); Barboglio v.
Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 P. 385 (1923).
—Not n e c e s s a r y .
The determination that a roadway has been
continuously used by members of the general
public for at least ten years is the sole requirement for it to become a public road; it is not
necessary to prove the owner's intent to offer
the road to the public. Thurman v. Byram, 626
R2d 447 (Utah 1981).
l b establish a dedication of a road to a public
use, it is not necessary to prove landowner's
intent to dedicate the road to a public use. Leo
M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches,
639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981).
Private rights.
Creation of a private right in a public thoroughfare cannot occur; a prescriptive right is in
conflict with the dedication of land to the use of
the general public. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d
910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
"Public" defined.
Owners of property abutting or straddling
rural road and their personal visitors were not
members of public generally within this provision; burden of proving real public use of t h a t
road continuously for ten years was not met in
suit by subdividers who sought to establish
that the road had become a public thoroughfare. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438
P.2d 545 (1968).
Rights granted t o public.
City still owned fee to strip, acquired under
Tbwnsite Act (43 U.S.C. § 718 et seq., now
repealed), after alleged dedication thereof as
public street, so t h a t only right that public
could have acquired would be right to easement
across strip for traveling purposes, and only
additional right contiguous property owners
Blight acquire would be right of ingress to and
egress from their property. Premium Oil Co. v.
Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947).

72-5-104

R i g h t s of s u b s e q u e n t grantees.
Where land is dedicated by owner as highway
and is accepted by public as such, all subsequent grantees of abutting lands are bound by
dedication. Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64
P. 955 (1901).
Sufficiency of proof of dedication.
Highway over privately owned ground will be
deemed dedicated or abandoned to the public
use when the public h a s continuously used it as
a thoroughfare for a period of ten years. Morris
v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916).
For cases finding sufficient evidence to support finding of dedication to public use, see
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954
(1930); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116
P.2d 420 (1941); Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395,
326 P.2d 107 (1958); Clark v. Erekson, 9 Utah
2d 212, 341 P.2d 424 (1959).
Mere use by public of private alley in common
with owners of alley does not show a dedication
thereof to public use, or vest any right in public
to the way. Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340,
273 P.2d 720 (1954).
Though dedication of one's land to public use
should not be lightly regarded, where a narrow,
private dead-end street was used by neighboring residents and the general public without
interference for at least 25 years, and where the
city had platted it as a public street in 1915 and
had thereafter paved it and maintained a public street sign at its entrance, and where plaintiff who owned the fee simple interest in the
land on which the street was situated had not
paid any taxes on the street property for 25
years, this combination of factors was sufficient
to justify finding t h a t the street had been
dedicated to public use. Bonner v. Sudbury, 18
Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646 (1966).
Clear and convincing quantum and quality of
proof is required for the establishment of a
public thoroughfare or taking of another's property. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493
P.2d 639 (1972).
Where the trial court found that public had
used north-south road for 12 years and t h a t
during this time, the road was ten feet wide,
and the court found t h a t there was insufficient
use of an east-west road by the public to make
it a public road, these findings of fact, supported by substantial evidence, compelled a
holding that the north-south road was a public
highway ten feet wide and that no public highway existed on the east-west road. Western
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987).
Because there were material issues of fact as
to whether people using a road were members
of the general public or landowners in the area,
who had either a private right or permission to
use the road, and there were conflicting statements as to public use of the road for recre-
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ational purposes, summary judgment in favor
of the proponents of dedication was erroneous.
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d
1097 (Utah 1995).
Finding t h a t a road was not a public thoroughfare was proper based on evidence that the
road was generally used only during the deer
hunting season and was frequently closed to
the public at other times, and that its use
during the hunting season was by permission of
the owners. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962
P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
T h o r o u g h f a r e " a n d "public thoroughfare" d i s t i n g u i s h e d .
Under identically worded predecessor section, a "thoroughfare" was a place or way
through which there is passing or travel. It

became a "public thoroughfare" when the public
acquired a general right of passage. Morris v
Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916).
Width of roadway.
Although t h e r e Nvas some incidental evidence
in the record regarding the width of the road in
question, it was not error for the district court
to refuse to determine the width of the road
when that issue was not the focus of the litigation. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225
(Utah 1995).
Generally, the width of a public road is determined according to what is reasonable and
necessary under all the facts and circumstances. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways,
Streets, and Bridges § 24 et seq.

C.J.S. — 39A C.J.S. Highways § 15.

72-5-105. Highways once established continue until abandoned.
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction
over any highway, or by other competent authority.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 90; C. 1953,
27-12-90; r e n u m b e r e d by L. 1998, ch. 270,
§ 133.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1998 amend-

ment, effective March 21, 1998, renumbered
this section, which formerly appeared as §
27-12-90, and made a stylistic change.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
authorities, rights of abutting owners will not
be affected. Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501,
126 P. 959 (1912).

ANALYSIS

Abutting owners' rights.
Bridges.
Notice of abandonment required.
Platted but unused streets.
Power of city to abandon.
Requisites for abandonment.
A b u t t i n g o w n e r s ' rights.
While public may abandon street or highway
insofar as it affects rights of public therein,
such abandonment, however, will not affect
rights of abutting owner with respect to use of
easement for ingress and egress to and from his
premises. Hague v. J u a b County Mill & Elevator Co., 37 Utah 290, 107 P. 249 (1910).
Where property is sold with reference to a
map or plat showing it to abut on a public
highway, this constitutes an implied covenant
that highway will not be obstructed or interfered with by grantor. While highway by abandonment may pass out of jurisdiction of local

Bridges.
Bridge owned by county was an essential
part of road and could not be abandoned except
as provided by statute. Adney v. State Rd.
Comm'n, 67 Utah 567, 248 P. 811 (1926).
N o t i c e of a b a n d o n m e n t required.
County commissioners may not order abandonment of a county road unless notice thereof
is given. Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P2d 595
(Utah 1974).
Platted but u n u s e d streets.
Corporation was able to give good title to
land platted for streets and alleyways but
never used as such, since under proviso informer law, road not used or worked for five
years ceased to be a highway. Mallory v..
Taggart, 24 Utah 2d 267, 470 P 2 d 254 (1970).
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Randy Butler, et al.,
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:

Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants

This matter came before the Court for trial on June 1,2004. The case continued through
7 days of testimony concluding with closing arguments on June 15. The Court has taken the
matter under advisement and now renders this Memorandum Decision.
The Plaintiffs have asked this Court to determine that a route described as the Benny
Creek Road is a public highway under Utah Code Annotated section 72-5-104,1953 as
amended.1 hi addition, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to exercise its equitable powers to restrain the
Defendantsfromblocking the roadfrompublic use and declare arightof way along the road for
the public, although it seems that a declaration mat the route is a public highway would render a
further declaration of a public right of way to be superfluous. The Plaintiffs also ask for damages
of $10.00 per day since July 29,1997 when notice was provided to the Defendants that they were

formerly 27-12-89, renumbered in 1998. The statute has
remained substantially unchanged since first enacted by the
Territorial Legislature in 1886, Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v.
Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah, 1929).
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improperly blocking a public highway under Utah Code Annotated section 72-7-104 and an
identical Utah County Ordinance (17-3-1-1).
In a case such as this the Court is required to consider "reconstruction of historical facts
concerning timing, nature, and the extent of public usage

[Witnesses are required to dredge

the recesses of their minds for aged memories," Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910 at 912 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996). Over 60 witnesses have testified in this trial recalling facts and circumstances from
as early as 1927. Nearly half provided the Court with memories preceding 1960. None of the
witnesses, in the view of this Court, attempted to mis-lead or do anything other than give an
honest and complete recitation of what they recall. Even so, when the testimony is compared to
pictures, maps and other testimony some statements must be given greater credibility than others.
Public Highway
Three factors must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order for a route to
be deemed a dedicated highway, abandoned to the use of the public under U.C.A. section 72-5104: "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period often years.
.. .Once the technical provisions of [the statute] have been satisfied, the road is a 'public
highway.' The court has no discretion to ignore that fact." Campbell v. Box Elder County. 962
P.2d 806 at 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) citing Heber Citv Corp. v. Simpson. 942 P.2d 307 at 310
(Utah, 1997). There is no requirement of proof of the owner's intent to offer the road to the
public. Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 at 213 (Utah, 1981); see also Draper
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City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 at 1099 (Utah, 1995) and Thurman v. Bvram. 626 P.2d
445 at 449 (Utah 1981).
Continuous Use
Continuous use is established where the public has "made a continuous and uninterrupted
use of the road as often as they found it convenient or necessary," Campbell 962 P.2d at 809.
The "use may be continuous though not constant,... provided it occurred as often as the
claimant had occasion to chose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption." Id at 809 (citing
Richards v. Pines Ranch. Inc.. 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977).
In this case the evidence was that a route of travel from U.S. Highway 89 near the
"Birdseye Church" has extended west toward the Uintah National Forest since before the
memory of any witness. An ariel photograph taken in 1949 clearly shows the road extending
from the highway into the vicinity of the national forest. Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson
both testified that their family owned the property now owned by Defendant Randy Butler
(herinafter "Gardner Property") from 1927 until 1963 and that they lived on the property along
the road from 1925 or 1933 (depending upon which sister is considered) until 1949. During that
time the road was traveled often and no attempts were made by the family to restrict or deny
access to the road to any members of the public. One witness for the Defendants, Lloyd Jackson,
testified that he trailed sheep across the Gardner property between 1947 and 1955. He also
hunted in the area every year until 1965. He testified that his father "made arrangements" with
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Mr. Gardner to move the sheep across the property on the way to the forest service property. The
Defendant insists that this travel was, therefore, by permission. However, the witness did not
participate in the discussion and both parties to the actual arrangements are deceased. It was
apparent that the Gardners had cattle on their property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the
sheep to get into the cattle-the herds needed to be kept apart. The conversations and
arrangements were just as likely an effort to work out the details of the operation as to gain
permission to travel a road. Contrasted with that testimony are the statements by Duane Newitt,
Ron Davis, Reneae Swenson, Glen Roberts, Norris Dalton, Youd Barney, Hugh Tangren, Don
Daley, Craig Ingram, and Glen Thatcher. All of these witnesses personally used the road for
recreation including hunting,fishing,camping and sightseeing in the 1940's and 50's. None
encountered locked gates or sought permission. None were ever prevented from traveling the
road. Several, including Norris Dalton and Hugh Tangren, drove vehicles well into forest service
property.
There was testimony that travel was impacted by the weather. Springs or bogs in the
road were worse in wetter times of the year and occasionally restricted travel by vehicle. Winter
snow was not plowed off of this mountain road. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and
convincing that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the road was open and traveled by the public as
often as necessary or convenient, interrupted only by naturally occurring conditions such as
groundwater (spring water) in wet years and snow in the winter.

Page 4 o f

18

m i £7n

Mr. Butler and his parents (J. Lee Butler and Diane Butler) recalled family hunting trips
between 1958 and 1962 when family members accompanied the family patriarch, Barney Newitt
(Diane Butler's father, Randy Butler's grandfather) to a location in Sanpete County to obtain a
key before traveling up the road to camp just below the bog on property now owned by
Defendants Blaine and Linda Evans. Randy Butler has a particularly vivid memory from
approximately 1962 when, at age 7, he saw his grandfather get out of the truck to unlock a gate
and spotted a buck which he shot before opening the gate to allow continued travel on the road.
Contrasted against this vivid and believable recollection, however, is other important evidence.
Only the Poulson family has been identified as property owners who lived in Sanpete County.
Barney Newitt and Grandmother Poulsen, to whom he would have spoken in 1958 to 1962 about
a key are both deceased. Steve Poulson testified that to his knowledge the only locked gate on
the Poulson property during that time was on a side road south off the Benny Creek road toward
an old bunkhouse. Duane Newitt, the brother of Diane Butler, testified that he camped and
hunted with the family during those years and does not recall any locked gates. Nineteen other
witnesses testified that they traveled the road for a variety of purposes during that time and never
encountered any locked gates. None of the other witnesses ever felt it necessary to obtain
permission from property owners to travel the road.
Other witnesses testified for the Defendants that there were locked gates on the road.
Virgil Neeves testified that between 1958 and 1980 there was a locked gate near the Gardner
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home (the last home traveling west toward the forest service property, now occupied by
Defendant Randy Butler) which was locked most of the time. He specifically recalled a "cock
fight"2 up the road in 1972 when only people who were supposed to participate were given keys
to the gate. A cockfight,of course, is an illegal activity and the one time use of the gate to
discourage discovery or participation by persons not known to the participants can hardly be
considered to be a termination of general public access. Mr. Neeves' other access to the area was
usually across cojuntryfromthe property he worked to the north (the Dixon Ranch) to work on
water diversion works along Bennie Creek. He saw people stuck on the road and recalls a cable
across the road to stop cars. His memories are simply confused and inconsistent with all of the
other testimony about obstructions on the road in question. There is evidence of a cable across a
side road belonging to the Poulson family.
Mike Condley testified that he lived in the area from 1970 until 1979. Although he does
not recall any locks after 1979, he firmly recalled a locked gate near the Gardner (Butler) home.
However, no other witness corroborates this point and descriptions of locked gates by the Butler

2

"Cockfights" are illegal contests between roosters bred and
trained to fight typically involving wagering and serious threat
of injury to the animals. Presently outlawed by U.C.A. section
76-9-301(1) (e), the practice has been illegal in this State since
at least 1898. The Revised Statutes of the State of Utah,
January 1, 1898 section 4454 provided that "any person who shall
keep or use any . . . fowl, or bird, for the purpose of fighting
. . . and any person who shall be a party to or be present as a
spectator at any such fighting . . . shall be adjudged guilty of
a misdemeanor."
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family, Defendant Blaine Evans and others put the locked gates farther west, near the present
cattle guard between the Butler home and forest service property.
Finally Elizabeth Condley testified that between 1967 and 1977 the gates were never
locked in the summer but that they were locked late in every fall. However, her testimony was
that she traveled the road on horseback during the summer. There was nothing given to explain
how she could have known that the gate was locked in the fall.
The heaviest use of the property was clearly for hunting deer and elk in the fall season.
Several dozen witness testified that they personally hunted the area between 1958 and 1980 and
never encountered locked gates or were otherwise prevented from using the road. Division of
Wildlife Resources officers Gurley and Briggs both patrolled the area to check hunters during
that period. Dale Gurley, in particular, patrolled between 1968 and 1991 sometimes observing as
many as 25 or 30 hunters in the forest service area who had traveled up the Benny Creek road to
hunt. Officer Gurley never encoimtered locked gates and never needed permission to access the
area to check on hunters and fishermen. Kent Comaby, Forest Service supervisor, routinely
traveled the road during the 60's and 70's. Entrance to the forest service during that time was
marked by signs.
Shirlene Otteson testified that her family purchased the Gardner property in 1964 and
owned it until 1981. During that time she was regularly on the property with her husband and
children. The road was considered and treated by her family as a public road during that time.
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No attempt was made to close the road during that time. There was testimony that one defense
witness, John Mendenhall, was told by Ms. Otteson's father, Mr. Roach, to stop hunting and
leave the property. However he testified that he was a teenager with three other teenagers and no
adult. He was hunting well off the road on the Roach (Gardner/now Butler) property. Ordering
teenagers to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates with restricting travel on the road.
There was testimony that the road is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to
property along the road and that when that occurs, the road becomes impassable. However,
neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method of irrigation,
covering a period from 1925 to 1981.
There was substantial testimony about signs along the road. The Defendants have
insisted that there were many signs, perpendicular to the road, coupled with posts painted yellow
and orange clearly designating the area as private property. Most of Plaintiffs' witnesses testified
that they saw the signs but considered them warning against leaving the road but not a warning
against traveling on the road. The evidence was that the signs were placed on various locations
along the edge of the road west of the Gardner home and, in particular, around a wire gate in the
vicinity of a present cattle guard.
Utah Code Annotated section 23-20-14 provides a mechanism for private property
owners to restrict hunter access to their property by posting:
"Properly posted" means that "No Trespassing" signs or a minimum of 100 square
inches of bright yellow, bright orange, or flourescent paint are displayed at all
Page 8 o f
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corners,fishingstreams crossing property lines, roads, gates, and rights-of-way
entering the land. If metal fence posts are used, the entire exterior side must be
painted."
The plain and obvious intent of the statute is to require physical notation or warning at the
entrance or on the edge of property. Members of the public encountering such signs would have
to conclude, based upon the statute, that they were at a property line or on the edge of private
property, meaning that where they are standing is not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a
fence running parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition of the sign, more clearly
indicate the fence as a boundary than prohibiting travel along the roadfromwhich the signs can
be seen. The signs and painted posts in this case clearly did what the plaintiffs' witnesses
assumed-they prohibited travel off of the road, not on the road.
There was testimony regarding four gates on the Benny Creek road between U.S.
Highway 89 and the Uintah National Forest. Traveling westfromthe highway, thefirstgate
location is near the Gardner home (presently the Randy and Donna Butler home). All but one
witness described the versions of this gate prior to 1996 as a drift wire gate that was never
locked. All testified and assumed it was used to assist in livestock operations and not to restrict
general travel on the road.
The second gate to the west was within 100 yards of a present cattle gate. Also a wire
gate, most witnesses did not recall any locks and that the gate was only occasionally closed.
These witnesses assumed that, again, the gate was for use with livestock operations and not
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intended to restrict travel on the road. There was also testimony, however, that this gate was
locked on occasion after 1980 and the implication was that this was the gate unlocked by Barney
Newitt in the late 50's and early 60's. Remnants of the gate still exist, including a weathered
piece of plywood which was brought into court. This evidence is simply too skimpy and too
removed to conclude that the fence was locked and signed to disrupt public travel particularly in
the face of all the witness who regularly traveled the road and recalled no locks or road
restrictions.
There was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber and located near an ancient
bridge spanning one of the ditches or streams crossing the road. One witness testified that the
gate had been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a yellow pole
described as the remnants of the bridge. However, again, this minimal evidence is overwhelmed
by the substantial testimony of persons who used and drove the road on all seasons between 1925
and 1980 without encountering any locked gate.
The fourth gate is at the entrance to the forest service property. There has been a sign
indicating the entrance to the forest service for at least 35 years and the forest service property
has clearly been fenced in the memory of all witnesses. A sign, still on the gate, asks users to
"please close the gate."3 The obstruction was obviously intended to restrict the travel of cattle
3

What was formerly a wire livestock gate has been replaced
with a cattle guard. A metal gate nearby allows horses and
livestock to move through the fence when required. The sign is
presently on the metal gate.
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and sheep, not people.
It is established, by clear and convincing evidence that the road was in continuous use by
the public.
Public Thoroughfare
The term "thoroughfare" is not defined in any Utah statute. Competent legal authority
defines the term as "a street or way opening at both ends into another street or public highway, so
that one can go through and get out of it without returning. It differs from a cul de sac, which is
open only at one end.'* The Utah Supreme Court has stated that:
[w]hile it is difficult to fix a standard by which the measure what is a public use
or a pubhc thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was used by many and
different persons for a variety of purposes; that it was open to all who desired to
use it; that the use made of it was as general and extensive as the situation and
surroundings would permit, had the road been formally laid out as a public
highway by public authority."
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos. 75 Utah 384,285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah 1929).
The Court has also stated that a "'thoroughfare' is a place or way through which there is
passing or travel. It becomes a 'public thoroughfare' when the public have a generalrightof
passage." Gillmor v. Carter, 15 U.2d 280,391 P.2d 426 at 428 (Utah 1964).
In another case evidence that the road was generally impassable, that the road failed to
connect or lead to public property and that there had been only minimal maintenance were

^ouvier's Law Dictionary, Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing
Company, Cleveland: 1946.
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reasons to overturn a determination by summary judgment that a proposed road was a highway
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097 at 1100-1101 (Utah 1995). Of course the
Draper City case did not determine that the road known as the "Lower Comer Canyon Road"
could not be determined to be a public highway in the face of such evidence, only that the issue
could not be resolved via summary judgment. This case is in a substantially different posture.
This Court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, the following facts about the
Benny Creek road. The road or path connects U.S. Highway 89 and the Uintah National Forest.
Paths and trails from the top or terminus of the road travel over the moimtain and connect to the
Nebo Loop Road. During certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and 1980 there were
springs or ditches which created bogs making travel through or around difficult or impossible.
Nevertheless, there was regular maintenance performed on the road by Utah County, the United
States Forest Service and landowners during that time. The road was graded as needed or
following significant storms during the 1950's. The County has had a contract with the forest
service requiring them to maintain the road from 1974 through the present time. There was no
evidence that the County has not honored that contract. One witness for the Defense testified
that he operated a grader for the County and only gradedfromthe church to the Gardner home
for several years. Others, however, testified that they graded the roadfromthe termination of
oiled road in Birdseye to the forest service property at least twice per year during the decades of
the 60fs and 70's. The testimony established a wide variety of uses including travel to the forest
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service and adjoining private property forfishing,deer hunting, elk hunting, cougar hunting
(during the winter), hiking, family outings, general sightseeing, labor on irrigation headwaters,
movement of cattle and sheep, law enforcement related to wildlife regulations, and maintenance
of forest trails and signs by forest service employees. Vehicles, horses, trailers, hikers, bikes and
motorcycles were all driven at various times the entire length of the road ending on forest service
property.
The Court concludes that the road was a public thoroughfare before 1980.
10 years
The statute specifies a 10 year period. This Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence
that even if it is concluded (which this Court does not) that the road was gated and locked in the
late 50fs and early 60's as described by the Butlers, the road was used as necessary and
convenient by the public for more than 10 years before that time and, again, 10 years after that
time.
Reasonable and Necessary Width
Having determined that the Benny Creek road was a public highway before 1980 by clear
and convincing evidence, this Court must also determine the reasonable and necessary width of
the highway, Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 at 914 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), U.C.A. Section 72-5104(3). The only testimony on this point was that of Clyde Naylor, a qualified engineer and
longtime director of public works for Utah County. Mr. Naylor testified that a width of 20 feet
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plus a three foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was reasonably necessary for
anticipated travel. There being no evidence to the contrary the Court finds that the width of the
roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder on each side.5
Injunction
As noted above, the issuance of an injunction may be mooted by the determination that
the road is a public highway. Nevertheless, it is the order of this Court that the Defendants
refrain from blocking, locking or otherwise interfering with public access to the Benny Creek
road. It should be noted that the determination expressed in this decision takes into account the
occasional use of the road for transportation of irrigation water. While there was little or no
evidence that the road was actually used in lieu of an irrigation pipe or ditch before 1980, the
testimony was not controverted that with the present, improved condition of the road, the
occasional presence of irrigation water on the road will not substantially interfere with public use
5

The Court notes that a legal description of the centerline
of the road generated from a survey of the road itself was
introduced into evidence. The description was challenged by
counsel for the Defendants since it appears to lie in a different
township or range than the legal description of the Defendants'
properties. Testimony was also presented that indicated that
several years ago the adjoining property owners agreed to
establish their respective boundaries as the center of the
roadway and confirmed that agreement by recorded boundary line
agreement. No expert testimony was presented to assist this
Court to determine if there is a conflict in the two positions or
how such a conflict, if it exists, should be resolved. The Court
merely determines, today, that the road as it presently exists is
a public highway, 20 feet wide with a three foot shoulder on each
side.
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of the road.
Fines
U.C.A. section 72-7-104 provides that any person who installs, places or maintains a
structure within the right-of-way of a highway must remove the structure within ten days of
notice. Upon failure to remove the structure "[a] highway authority may recover:... (b) $10 for
each day the installation remained within the right-of-way after notice was complete." Notice to
Mr. and Mrs. Butler was completed on July 29,1997. Calculated from 10 days after service to
the date of this decision, 2,561 days have passed.
Nevertheless, several factors must also be considered. There was testimony that a locked
gate was constructed in 1996 by Mr. Butler. There was also substantial testimony that many
people were unable to travel the road after that time without gaining permission or using a key
provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler. However, one exhibit shows a gate created by the County
which allowed travel past the Butler gate, although admonishing travelers to close the gate and
stay on the road until arriving at the forest service. As noted above there have historically been
gates across the road for purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An unlocked gate is
consistent with this pattern and would not be considered to violate the right-of-way declared
today. Consequently, for some of the time since construction of the metal Butler gate the road
has been obstructed and for some of the time it has not. No evidence was presented to clarify
how many of the intervening 2,561 days were days when the road was obstructed and how many
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were not. The Plaintiffs, as the moving party in seeking to obtain the penalty, had the burden of
providing specific evidence of the number of days the Defendants have been in violation. Merely
showing initial service and testimony that persons were stopped from time to time during the last
6 or 7 years does not meet that burden. Inasmuch as the Court cannot determine with reasonable
precision the number of days during which a violation of the State statute and County ordinances
existed no penalty can be imposed.
Costs of Court
The Plaintiffs are, however, as the prevailing party entitled to recover reasonable costs of
court to be established by affidavit.
Conclusion
In this decision the Court has avoided reference to facts and circumstances after 1980.
The Court is convinced by what it considers to be clear and convincing evidence that a public
highway was established on the Benny Creek Road decades before the Butler, Evans or even
Condley families ever came into possession of the property abutting the road. As a member of
the public of this county, state and nation this Court is ashamed that these Defendants have had
to suffer abuse at the hands of the general public. Their cattle have been stolen and killed. Their
property has been littered. Their lives have been threatened. The distance from "the valley"
gives a certain solitude and quiet peace equally attractive to the people who have made Birdseye
their home, people who wish to enjoy the natural beauty as visitors and people who wish to
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escape rules of behavior. Bullet holes in signs and beer cans and used syringes littering the
landscape are not proud symbols of Utah and America. That said, it is also clear that other good
and responsible people have used and cherished the area. It was obviously a particularly special
place for the Newitt family. Grandchildren have caught their first fish in Benny Creek and
dozens and dozens of hunters have relished a yearly visit to Deer Hollow-which was not
accidentally named.
It is the business of this Court, sitting in equity, to resolve the needs and desires of
competing interests. The law properly demands great deference to private ownership and
property rights. In this case, however, the evidence is clear and convincing that the road in
question has been a public thoroughfare connecting a national forest and recreation area to a
national highway for decades and generations.
Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to preparefindingsof fact, conclusions of law and an
order consistent with this decision.
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SCOTT L WIGGINS (5820)
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C.
AMERICAN PLAZA II, SUITE 105
57 WEST 200 SOUTH
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-4333
Facsimile: (801) 328-2405
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY and STATE OF UTAH,
)
by and through its DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, DIVISION
;
OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES,
;
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 000403372

]

v.

t

RANDY BUTLER; DONNA BUTLER,
etal,

;
)

Defendants.

'1

Judge James R. Taylor

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS'
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

COME NOW Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, and Blaine Evans, by and

nnusfi

through counsel, Mark E. Arnold and Scott L Wiggins, of and for Arnold & Wiggins,
P.C., and submit the following objection to Plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law together with a request for oral argument on the on the following
objections.
Defendants respectfully object to the following proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law for the following reasons:
1.

Finding no. 6 presumes evidence not founded on evidence in that it is based

upon testimony for which no witness has memory.
2.

Finding no. 8 is not supported by the evidence in that both witnesses were

unable to testify as to whether or not the individuals observed using the road were
members of the public or not and the finding should be limited to the fact that each
witness was unaware of any attempts to restrict or deny access and not that there were
"no" attempts or restrictions.
3.

Finding no. 9 is not supported by the evidence in that no testimony was

offered to the fact that any cattle located on the Gardner property was owned by the
Gardners.
4.

Finding no. 10 is not supported by the evidence in that there was no

testimony that several witnesses "drove vehicles well into the forest service property"
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because no testimony was offered that the road in fact extended up to and well into the
service property, and that several people had in fact traveled it, including the individuals
so named in the finding.
5.

Finding no. 11 is not supported by the evidence in that no testimony was

offered as to how frequently the bog restricted traffic. The testimony certainly was not
that the traffic was "occasionally restricted." Further, there was no testimony to support
the finding that the road was continuously passible by foot, horseback, or horse drawn
wagon and that the bog restricted only vehicular traffic.
6.

Finding no. 17 is not supported by the evidence in that Mr. Mendenhall's

testimony was such that he said that he considered the road as part of Mr. Roach's pasture
and he understood that when he was kicked off the property, the property included the
road as well.
7.

Finding no. 18 is not supported by the evidence in that no testimony was

offered as to the Gardner or Otteson (Roach) irrigation practices or the method they used
to transport water to their fields or to other down-stream users of the irrigation water.
8.

Finding no. 19 is not supported by the evidence in that no testimony was

offered as to their consideration of State law when deciding whether or not the signs
pertained to the road and the Defendants' fields or just the fields stretching along the
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road.
9.

Finding no. 22 is not supported by the evidence in that persons "who used

and drove" the Road did so in all seasons between 1925 and 1980.
10.

Finding no. 25 is not supported by the evidence in that the testimony did not

establish that the Forest Service ever maintained the road, and that the road was regularly
maintained between the years of 1925 and 1980. Further, the County did not have a
contract with the Forest Service to maintain the road from 1974 through the present, and
the County never introduced any evidence of an employee who graded the road prior to
thel980'sand90's.
11.

Finding no. 29 is not supported by the evidence in that the finding and the

written decision of the Court ignores the evidence presented that the road was sufficiently
narrow that cars could not turn around and on occasion they had to back down in order to
get back to U.S. Highway 89.
12.

Finding no. 32 is not supported by the evidence in that the Court never

ruled that the County obtained a "right-of-way" but instead the Court found pursuant to
State statute that a road was abandoned to public use by the Defendants and their
predecessors in interest.
13.

Finding no. 33 is not supported by the evidence in that no testimony was
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offered establishing "decades and generations."
14.

Conclusion of Law no 7 appears to be a finding of fact rather than a

conclusion of law and in that respect is not supported by the evidence that the property
was abandoned as a public road 20 feet in width with a 3-foot shoulder on each side.
15.

Conclusions of Law 8 and 9 are findings of fact, and Defendants object for

the same reasons stated in paragraph number 11, above.
16.

Defendants object to *fl of the proposed order insofar as it does not state an

amount certain.
DATED this 9th day of August, 2004.

ARNOLD & WIGGINS^P^

Mark E. Arnold
Attorneys for Defendants
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY and STATE OF UTAH, by
and through its DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, DIVISION OF
WILDLIFE RESOURCES,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
RANDY BUTLER, DONNA BUTLER,
MARGARET CONDLEY, MICHAEL E.
CONDLEY, ELIZABETH CONDLEY,
BLAINE EVANS, LINDA EVANS and JOHN
DOES 1 through 15

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS'
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AN
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT;
OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR
ORAL ARGUMENT, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, REQUEST FOR
EXPEDITED HEARING; REQUEST
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
Civil No. 000403372
Division No. VII
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COME NOW Plaintiffs Utah County and State of Utah, by and through its Department of
Natural Resources, Division of Wildlife Resources (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Plaintiffs"), by and through counsel undersigned, and hereby respectfully submits this Response
to Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact and Request for Oral
Argument; Objection to Request for Oral Argument, or in the Alternative, Request for Expedited
Hearing; Request for Attorneys' Fees.
ARGUMENT
The Court after seven days of trial followed by a morning of closing arguments issued a
thorough Memorandum Decision on June 16, 2004. Defendants' Objection is in all actuality an
objection to the Court's Memorandum Decision because Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order is nearly verbatim of the Memorandum Decision. Any proposed
changes are minor and are not substantive in nature.
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' Objection is merely a ruse to further delay the
opening of the gate across the Bennie Creek Road. As the hunting seasons approach,1 the public
will continue to experience irreparable harm, even though the Court has ruled that the public has
an easement across the Bennie Creek Road.

*The archery deer hunt commences on August 21, 2004. The archery elk hunt
commences on August 26,2004. The muzzleloader deer hunt commences on September 29,
2004. The rifle elk hunt commences on October 9, 2004. The rifle deer hunt commences on
October 23, 2004. The muzzleloader elk hunt commences on November 6, 2004.
Page 2 of 17
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A.

Plaintiffs9 Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order are
Nearly Verbatim of the Memorandum Decision Dated June 16, 2004.

Plaintiffs respond to each of the objections posed by Defendants as follows:
Proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 states as
follows:
That the Road follows a route of travel from U.S. Highway 89 near
the "Birdseye Church" and has extended west toward the Uinta
National Forest since before the memory of any witness.
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
In this case the evidence was that a route of travel from U.S.
Highway 89 near the "Birdseye Church" has extended west toward
the Uintah National Forest since before the memory of any witness.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 3, paragraph 2, sentence 1.
Proposed Finding of Fact No. 8 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 8 states as
follows:
That Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson both testified that their family
owned the property now owned by Defendants Randy Butler and Donna
Butler (hereinafter referred to as "Gardner Property") from 1927 until
1963 and that they lived on the property along the Road from 1925 or
1933 (depending upon which sister is considered) until 1949. During that
time the Road was traveled by the public often and no attempts were made
by the family to restrict or deny access to the Road to any members of the
public.
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
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Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson both testified that their family
owned the property now owned by Defendant Randy Butler
(herinafter "Gardner Property") from 1927 until 1963 and that they
lived on the property along the road from 1925 or 1933 (depending
upon which sister is considered) until 1949. During that time the
road was traveled often and no attempts were made by the family
to restrict or deny access to the road to any members of the public.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 3, paragraph 2, sentence 3.
3.

Proposed Finding of Fact No. 9 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 9 states as
follows:
That Loyd Jackson, a defense witness, testified that he trailed
sheep across the Gardner property between 1947 and 1955. He
also hunted in the area every year until 1965. He testified that his
father "made arrangements" with Mr. Gardner to move sheep
across the Gardner's property on the way to the forest service
property. Defendants insist that this travel was, therefore, by
permission. However, Mr. Jackson did not participate in the
discussions and both parties to the actual arrangements are
deceased. It was apparent that the Gardners had cattle on their
property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the sheep to get into
the cattle, as the herds needed to be kept apart. The conversations
and arrangements were just as likely an effort to work out the
details of the operation as to gain permission to travel the Road.
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
. . . Loyd Jackson, testified that he trailed sheep across the Gardner
property between 1947 and 1955. He also hunted in the area every
year until 1965. He testified that his father "made arrangements"
with Mr. Gardner to move sheep across the property on the way to
the forest service property. The Defendant insists that this travel
was, therefore, by permission. However, the witness did not
participate in the discussion and both parties to the actual
arrangements are deceased. It was apparent that the Gardners had
cattle on their property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the
Page 4 of 17
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sheep to get into the cattle-the herds needed to be kept apart. The
conversations and arrangements were just as likely an effort to
work out the details of the operation as to gain permission to travel
a road.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 3, paragraph 2, sentence 5.
4.

Proposed Finding of Fact No. 10 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 10 states as
follows:
That Duane Newitt, Ron Davis, Renae Swenson, Glen Roberts,
Norris Dalton, Youd Barney, Hugh Tangren, Don Daley, Craig
Ingram, and Glen Thatcher, all personally used the Road for
recreation including hunting, fishing, camping, and sightseeing in
the 1940's and 50's. None of them encountered locked gates on the
Road or sought permission to use the Road. None of them were
ever prevented from traveling the Road. Several, including Norris
Dalton and Hugh Tangren, drove vehicles well into forest service
property.
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
. . . Duane Newitt, Ron Davis, Reneae Swenson, Glen Roberts,
Norris Dalton, Youd Barney, Hugh Tangren, Don Daley, Craig
Ingram, and Glen Thatcher. All of these witnesses personally used
the road for recreation including hunting, fishing, camping, and
sightseeing in the 1940's and 50's. None encountered locked gates
or sought permission. None were ever prevented from traveling
the road. Several, including Norris Dalton and Hugh Tangren,
drove vehicles well into forest service property.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 4, paragraph 1, sentence 5.

5.

Proposed Finding of Fact No. 11 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 11 states as
follows:
Page 5 of 17
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That travel on the Road was impacted by the weather. Springs or
bogs in the Road were worse in the wetter times of the year and
occasionally restricted travel by vehicle, but not by foot,
horseback, or horse drawn wagon. Winter snow was not plowed
off the Road. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and convincing
that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the road was open and
traveled by the public as often as necessary or convenient,
interrupted vehicular travel only by naturally occurring conditions
such as groundwater (spring water) in wet years and snow in the
winter. The springs and bogs in the Road were passable on foot,
horseback or by wagon even when vehicle access was restricted.
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
. .. that travel was impacted by the weather. Springs or bogs in the
road were worse in the wetter times of the year and occasionally
restricted travel by vehicle. Winter snow was not plowed off this
mountain road. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and convincing
that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the road was open and
traveled by the public as often as necessary or convenient,
interrupted only by naturally occurring conditions such as
groundwater (spring water) in wet years and snow in the winter.
Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 4, paragraph 2, sentence 1.
6.

Proposed Finding of Fact No. 17 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 17 states as
follows:
That Shirlene Otteson, a Plaintiffs witness, testified that her family
purchased the Gardner property in 1964 and owned it until 1981.
During that time she was regularly on the property with her
husband and children. The Road was considered and treated by her
family as a public road during that time. No attempt was made to
close the Road during that time. There was testimony that one
defense witness, John Mendenhall, was told by Mrs. Otteson's
father, Mr. Roach, to stop hunting and leave his property.
However, Mr. Mendenhall testified that he was a teenager with
Page 6 of 17

nniiQ5

three other teenagers and no adult. Mr. Mendenhall was hunting
well off the Road on the Roach (Gardner/now Butler) property.
Ordering teenagers to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates
with restricting travel on the Road.
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
Shirlene Otteson testified that her family purchased the Gardner
property in 1964 and owned it until 1981. During that time she
was regularly on the property with her husband and children. The
road was considered and treated by her family as a public road
during that time. No attempt was made to close th road during that
time. There was testimony that one defense witness, John
Mendenhall, was told by Ms. Otteson's father, Mr. Roach, to stop
hunting and leave his property. However he testified that he was a
teenager with three other teenagers and no adult. He was hunting
well off the road on the Roach (Garnder/now Butler) property.
Ordering teenagers to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates
with restricting travel on the road.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 7, paragraph 3, sentence 1.
7.

Proposed Finding of Fact No. 18 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 18 states as
follows:
That there was testimony that the Road is periodically used to
deliver irrigation water to property along the Road and that when
that occurs, the Road becomes impassable. However, neither the
Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method
of irrigation, covering a period from 1925-1981. A clear and
convincing majority of witnesses further traveled the Road
unrestricted by irrigation practices.
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
There was testimony that the road is periodically used to deliver
irrigation water to property along the road and that when that
Page 7 of 17

001437

occurs, the road becomes impassable. However, neither the
Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method
of irrigation, covering a period from 1925-1981.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 8, paragraph 2, sentence 1.
8.

Proposed Finding of Fact No. 19 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 19 states as
follows:
That there was substantial testimony about signs along the Road.
The Defendants have insisted that there were many signs,
perpendicular to the Road, coupled with posts painted yellow and
orange clearly designating the area as private property. Most of
Plaintiffs' witnesses testified that they saw the signs but considered
them warning against leaving the Road but not a warning against
traveling on the Road. The evidence was that the signs were
placed on various locations along the edge of the Road west of the
Gardner home to the forest boundary and, in particular, around a
wire gate in the vicinity of a present cattle guard. Members of the
public encountering signs posting property as provided by Utah
Code Ann. §23-20-14 would have to conclude, based upon Utah
Code Ann. § 23-20-14, that they were at a property line or on the
edge of private property, meaning that where they are standing is
not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a fence running
parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition of the
sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary than prohibiting
travel along the road from which the signs can be seen. The signs
and painted posts in this case clearly did what the Plaintiffs'
witnesses assumed, they prohibited travel off of the Road, not on
the Road. There was no testimony that any signs stated "Road
Closed."
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
There was substantial testimony about signs along the road. The
Defendants have insisted that there were many signs, perpendicular
to the road, coupled with posts painted yellow and orange clearly
designating the area as private property. Most of Plaintiffs'
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witnesses testified that they saw the signs but considered them
warning against leaving the road but not a warning against
traveling on the road. The evidence was that the signs were placed
on various locations along the edge of the road west of the Garnder
home and, in particular, around a wire gate in the vicinity of a
present cattle guard.
. . . Members of the public encountering such signs would have to
conclude, based upon the statute, that they were at a property line
or on the edge of private property, meaning that where they are
standing is not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a fence
running parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition
of the sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary then
prohibiting travel along the road from which the signs can be seen.
The signs and painted posts in this case clearly did what the
plaintiffs' witnesses assumed-they prohibited travel off of the road,
not on the road.
See Memorandum Decision date June 16, 2004, page 8, paragraph 3, sentence 1, page 9,
paragraph 1, sentence 2.
9.

Proposed Finding of Fact No. 22 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 22 states as
follows:
That there was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber
and located near an ancient bridge spanning one of the ditches or
streams crossing the Road. One witness testified that the gate had
been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a
yellow pole described as the remnants of a bridge. However,
again, this minimal evidence is overwhelmed by the substantial
testimony of persons who used and drove the Road in all seasons
between 1925 and 1980 without encountering any locked gate.
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
There was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber and
located near an ancient bridge spanning one of the ditches or
streams crossing the road. One witness testified that the gate had
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been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a
yellow pole described as the remnants of abridge. However,
again, this minimal evidence is overwhelmed by the substantial
testimony of persons who used and drove the road on all seasons
between 1925 and 1980 without encountering any locked gate.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 10, paragraph 2, sentence

10.

Proposed Finding of Fact No. 25 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 25 states as
follows:
That during certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and
1980 there were springs or ditches which created bogs at times
making vehicular or wagon travel through or around the bogs
difficult or impossible. Nevertheless, travel by foot or horse was
not restricted and there was regular maintenance performed on the
Road by Utah County, the United States Forest Service and
landowners during that time. The Road was graded as needed or
following significant storms during the 1950's. The County has
had a contract with the forest service requiring them to maintain
the Road from 1974 through the present time. There was no
evidence that the County has not honored that contract. One
witness for the Defense testified that he operated a grader for the
County and only graded from the church to the Gardner home for
several years. Others, however, testified that they graded the Road
from the termination of oiled road in Birdseye to the forest service
property at least twice per year during the decades of the 60fs and
70's.
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
During certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and 1980
there were springs or ditches which created bogs making travel
through or around difficult or impossible. Nevertheless, there was
regular maintenance performed on the road by Utah County, the
United States Forest Service and landowners during that time. The
Page 10 of 17
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road was graded as needed or following significant storms during
the 1950's. The County has had a contract with the forest service
requiring them to maintain the road from 1974 through the present
time. There was no evidence that the county has not honored that
contract. One witness for the Defense testified that he operated a
grader for the County and only graded from the church to the
Gardner home for several years. Others, however, testified that
they graded the road from the termination of oiled road in Birdseye
to the forest service property at least twice per year during the
decades of the 60's and 70fs.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 12, paragraph 2, sentence 3.

11.

Proposed Finding of Fact No. 29 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 29 states as
follows:
That the only testimony as to width of the Road was that of Clyde
Nay lor, a qualified engineer and longtime director of public works
for Utah County. Mr. Nay lor testified that a width of 20 feet plus a
three foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was
reasonably necessary for anticipated travel. There being no
evidence to the contrary the Court finds that the width of the
roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder
on each side.
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
The only testimony on this point was that of Clyde Naylor, a
qualified engineer and longtime director of public works for Utah
County. Mr. Naylor testified that a width of 20 feet plus a three
foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was
reasonably necessary for anticipated travel. There being no
evidence to the contrary the Court finds that the width of the
roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder
on each side.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 13, paragraph 4, sentence 2.
Page 11 of 17
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12.

Proposed Finding of Fact No. 32[sic] of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 31 states as
follows:
There was testimony that a locked gate was constructed in 1996 by
Mr. Butler. There was also substantial testimony that many people
were unable to travel the Road after that time without gaining
permission or using a key provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler.
However, one exhibit shows a sign created by the County which
allowed travel past the Butler gate, although admonishing travelers
to close the gate and stay on the Road until arriving at the forest
service. As noted above there have historically been gates across
the Road for purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An
unlocked gate is consistent with this pattern and would not be
considered to violate the right-of-way declared today.
The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
There was testimony that a locked gate was constructed in 1996 by
Mr. Butler. There was also substantial testimony that many people
were unable to travel the road after that time without gaining
permission or using a key provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler.
However, one exhibit shows a gate created by the County which
allowed travel past the Butler gate, although admonishing travelers
to close the gate and stay on the road until arriving at the forest
service. As noted above there have historically been gates across
the road for purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An
unlocked gate is consistent with this pattern and would not be
considered to violate the right-of-way declared today.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 15, paragraph 2, sentence 1.

13.

Proposed Finding of Fact No. 33 of which Defendants' object is nearly verbatim to a
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Finding of Fact No. 33 states as
follows:
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The Road has been a public thoroughfare connecting a national
forest and recreation area to a national roadway for decades and
generations.
1 he Cour I s I'\ lemorandum 1

. . .

^ .

s:

In this case, however, the evidence is clear and convincing that the
road in question has been a public thoroughfare connecting a
national forest and recreation area to a national highway for
decades and generations.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16 20u4 ra^e 1 7. paragraph 2, sentence 3.
14

Proposed Conclusionol ; ., -

• .-..v,. iJelendants object is near!) verbatim to a

lion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Conclusion of Law No. 7 states
as follows:
iiii)""jilan' hd'Hiii" i , : 'K0.
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The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
The Court concludes that the road was a pii \> •>,,. ;;,v •; oughfare before
1980.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004} page 13, paragraph 2, sentence
1. Plaintiffs further contend that proposed Con ::::lii ision of I a \ < 1 J : • J is i mixed
finding of fact and conclusion of law.
15.

Proposed Conclusions of I .awNos. 8 and 9 of w 1 licl :t Defendants' object directly coincide
to a portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision. Proposed Conclusions of Law Nos. 8
and 9, respectively state as follows:
8

Fhat having determined that the Road was dedicated and
abandoned to the public before 1980 by clear and convincing
Page 13 • If 1 ;
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evidence, this Court must also determine the reasonable and
necessary width of the Road. See Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910
and 914 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3).
9.

That the reasonable and necessary width of the Road to ensure safe
travel is 26 feet, including a 20 foot wide travel width and three (3)
foot shoulders on each side.

The Court's Memorandum Decision states as follows:
Having determined that the Benny Creek road was a public
highway before 1980 by clear and convincing evidence, this Court
must also determine the reasonable and necessary width of the
highway, Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910 and 914 (Utah Ct. App.
1996), U.C.A. Section 72-5-104(3). The only testimony on this
point was that of Clyde Nay lor, a qualified engineer and longtime
director of public works for Utah County. Mr. Nay lor testified that
a width of 20 feet plus a three foot shoulder on each side for a total
width of 26 feet was reasonably necessary for anticipated travel.
There being no evidence to the contrary the Court finds that the
width of the roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3
foot shoulder on each side.
See Memorandum Decision dated June 16, 2004, page 13, paragraph 4, sentence
1. Plaintiffs further contend that proposed Conclusions of Law Nos. 8 and 9 are
mixed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
16.

Proposed Order No. 7 of which Defendants' object is permissible and in accordance with
Rule 54(d)-(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, pursuant to Rule 54(e)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "the clerk must, within two days after the costs
have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose . . ." (emphasis added).

Page 14 of 17

flfiUPn

after they are ascertained, which will later be filled in by the clerk.
The above responses to Defendants' Objection surely demonstrate that Defendants in
h'iilih i h|ivl I tin I '
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Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order are nearly verbatim of the Memorandum Decision. An
proposed changes are minor and are not substantive in nature.
B.

The Court Should Deny Defendants' Request for Oral Argument, or in the
Alternative, Grant Plaintiffs' Requestfor an Expedited Hearing.

Since plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions ; : ,a\v. ana Order are nearly
verbatim of the Memorandum Decision, oral argument with respect to Defendants' Objections is
therefore not necessary. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' Objection together with their
R equest for Oral t \ig\ lment is an atten lpt tc • fi u thei :i "la;; > the openi :.

I

the

Bennie Creek Road, especially as the hunting seasons approach.
In the event, that the Court determines that a oral argument is warranted ;; Defendants'
Objections, then Plaintiffs request an expedited hearing so as to minimize the impact on the
public of the delay of opening the Bennie Creek Road.
"HI

"

Plaintiffs Their i

The Court should award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorney's fees for their bad faith

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, a court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if
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the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith.
In this case, Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order are
nearly verbatim of the Memorandum Decision. Defendants' Objection to the proposed Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order are in essence objections to the Court's Memorandum
Decision and are without merit and in bad faith. Therefore, the Court should award Plaintiffs
their reasonable attorney's fees in an amount to be determined by an attorney's fee affidavit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should find that Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order are nearly verbatim of the Memorandum Decision dated June 16,
2004 and uphold the same. The Court should deny Defendants' Request for Oral Argument, or
in the alternative, grant Plaintiffs' request for an expedited hearing. The Court should award
Plaintiffs their reasonable attorney's fees in an amount to be determined by an attorney's fee
affidavit.
Court oshould
also ggrant
any other relief deemed appropriate.
it. iFinally,
m a n j , the
tuv v^v/utju.
i i u u i u CIIO\J
i a i i i cu
DATED this (V. day of. _ _ ^ _ „ 2004.
PLAINTIFF UTAH COUNTY:

M. CORT GI
ROBERT J. MOORE
Deputy Utah County Attorneys
PLAINTIFF STATE OF UTAH;
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct com of the foregoing RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS'

;

< ?>

< ONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT; OBJECTION TO
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, REQUEST
EXPEDITED HEAI{IN<;, ItKOl ll'XI H >lt ATTORNEY'S FEES, postage prepaid, thisii^
day of fyJfa

, 2004, to the following:

MARK E. ARNOLD
SCOTT L. WIGGINS
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
57 West 200 South #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN *5594
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
Attorney for Plaintiff State of Utah
1594 West North Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
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M. CORT GRIFFIN #4583
ROBERT J. MOORE #8240
Deputy Utah County Attorneys
C. KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
Attorneys for Plaintiff Utah County
100 East Center Street, Suite 2400
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8001
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Fourth Judicial District Cc
of Utah County. SteuLor u
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MARTIN B. BUSHMAN #5594
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
Attorney for Plaintiff State of Utah
1594 West North Temple, Suite 2110
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-7227

IN THE FOURTH J U m n \ i DISTRICT COUR T
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY and STATE OF UTAH, by
and through its DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, DIVISIO?
WILDLIFE RESOURCES,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RANDY BUTLER, DONNA BUTLER,
MARGARET CONDLEY, MICHAEL E.
CONDLEY, ELIZABETH CONDLEY,
BLAINE EVANS, LINDA EVANS and
JOHN DOES 1 through 15,

Civil No. 000403372
Division No. 7
Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants.

0

152

This matter came before the Court on a bench trial consisting of June 1st, 2nd, 7 th , 8th, 9th, 10th,
14th, and 15th, 2004. Plaintiff Utah County was represented by M. Cort Griffin and Robert J. Moore,
Deputy Utah County Attorneys. Plaintiff State of Utah, by and through its Department of Natural
Resources, Division of Wildlife Resources, was represented by Martin B. Bushman, Assistant Utah
Attorney General. Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler, Blaine Evans, and Donna Evans were
represented by Mark E. Arnold and Scott Wiggins, of Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
The Court has reviewed the file, heard evidence at trial, issued a Memorandum Decision
dated June 16, 2004, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following findings of fact based upon the clear and convincing evidence
presented at trial, the admissions of Defendants, and the addition of the Butler Family Trust:
1.

That Defendants Randy Butler and Donna Butler are individuals residing in Utah County,
Utah, and are the trustees and/or successor trustees of the Butler Family Trust dated the April
11,2002, which is the owner of record of certain real properties more particularly described
as follows:
COM N 89 DEG 58'01"E ALONG SEC LINE 2661.78 FT FR NW COR
SEC 26, T10S, R3E, SLM; S 89 DEG 29'48"E 402.48 FT; S 12 DEG
07'30"W1083.73 FT; N 84 DEG 25'25"W 491.21 FT; N 86 DEG 46'28"W
114.33 FT; S 77 DEG 44'11"W 78.72 FT; S 59 DEG 32'05"W 73.23 FT; S
48 DEG 34'23"W 81.42 FT; S 66 DEG 14'50"W 60.21 FT; S 88 DEG
10'49"W 73.18 FT; N 79 DEG 55'36"W 86.59 FT; N 20 DEG 49"W 444.56
FT; N 13 DEG 12'01"W 265.17 FT; N 31 DEG 28'45"W 353.97 FT; N 61
DEG 03'58"W 244.51 FT; N 16 DEG 47'16"W 346.47 FT; N 12 DEG
28'38MW 368.34 FT; N 89 DEG 26'04"W 1047.86 FT; N 1 DEG 42'24"W
672.01 FT; S 8 DEG 50'11"E 1330.15 FT; S I DEG 47'12"E 1315.76 FT; N
89 DEG 58*01 "E 1330.89 FT TO BEG. AREA 56.76 ACRES.
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ALSO: COM SW COR SbU ZJ, i lOS, R3E, SLM; IN I ucv 42'24"W
671.48 FT; S 89 DEG 26'04"E 1047.86 FT; S 12 DEG 28'38"E 368.34 FT;
S 16 DEG 47'16"E 346.47 FT; S 61 DEG 03'58"E 244.51 FT; S 31 DEG
28'45"E 353.97 FT; S 13 DEG 12'01 "E 265.17 FT; S 20 DEG 00*49"E 444.56
FT; N 79 DEG 55'36"W 30.66 FT; N 81 DEG 57'45"W 80 FT; N 77 DEG
09'25"W 503.28 FT; S 83 DEG 57'05"W 131.47 FT; N 83 DEG 21T7"W
364.54 FT; N 65 DEG 44'39"W 278.69 FT; N 55 DEG 47'09"W 218.59 FT;
N 63 DEG 31'54"W 325.32 FT; N 587.40 FT TO BEG. AREA 50.30
ACRES.
ALSO: COM. AT NE COR OF SEC 27, 1 I u S, R 3 E, SLM; S 8.90 CHS;
N 63 3/8 W 19.86 CHS; 1. 1" "" CHS TO BEG. AREA 7.81 ACRES.
ALSO: M..

• i

ACRES.
2.

That Defendants Blaine Evans and Linda Evans are individuals residing in Utah County,
State of Utah, and aiu iln mum , ul n nml nl i n dun n ,il propiiln , ininc p,n In ul,u \\
described as follows:
BEG. 10 CHS S OF NW COR OF SEC 26, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM; S TO THE
TOP OF THE "GARDNER KNOLL" 19 CHS M OR 1; N-NE ALONG
EXISTING FENCE LINE TO A PT S 63 E 8.65 CHS TO EXISTING COR
POST; N 63 W 8.65 CHS M OR 1 TO BEG. AREA 8.22 ACRES M OR 1.
ALSO: COM AT SW COR. SEC. 27, R10S, R3E, SLB&M.; N u DEG
10'6"W 2651.35 FT; N 0 DEG 10'6"W 2651.35 FT; S 89 DEG 58 iO"E
2640.89 FT; S 89 DEG 58'10"E 1467.41 FT; S 63 DEG 23'0"E 1316.6 FT;
S 0 DEG 21'14"E 2078.28 FT; S 0 DEG 21'14"E 1333.77 FT; N 89 DEG
42'26"W 1323.7 FT; S 0 DEG 18'27"E 1331.74 FT; N 89 DEG 37'13"W
1324.8 FT; N 89 DEG 3713"W 2649.6 FT TO BEG. AREA 597 515 AC.
ALSO: Sl/2 OF SW1/4 & SW1/4 OF SE1/4 OF SEC 22, 1 ! S. k 3 h,
SLM. AREA 120 ACRES.
ALSO: Nl/2 Ui' b\. ; > ' ' '
AREA 160 ACRES.

= >' SI l -'. SEC 22, T 10 S, R 3 E, SLM.
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3.

That the Bennie Creek Road (hereinafter referred to as "Road") commences at or near
Birdseye, Utah at a junction with U.S. Highway 89, located in Section 25, Township 10
South, Range 3 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

4.

That from the Road's junction with U.S. Highway 89, it continues approximately 2.5 miles
in a westerly direction through Sections 25,26,27 and 22, Township 10 South, Range 3 East
Salt Lake Base and Meridian until it reaches the western edge of the Uinta National Forest.

5.

That over 60 witnesses testified at trial recalling facts and circumstances from as early as
1927. Nearly half provided the Court with memories preceding 1960. None of the
witnesses, in view of the Court, attempted to mis-lead or do anything other than give an
honest and complete recitation of what they recall. Even so, when the testimony is compared
to pictures, maps and other testimony some statements must be given greater credibility than
others.

6.

That the Road follows a route of travel from U.S. Highway 89 near the "Birdseye Church"
and has extended west toward the Uinta National Forest since before the memory of any
witness.

7.

That an ariel photo taken in 1946 clearly shows the Road extending from the highway into
the vicinity of the national forest.

8.

That Madge Truman and Ginnie Johnson both testified that their family owned the property
now owned by Defendants Randy Butler and Donna Butler (hereinafter referred to as
"Gardner Property") from 1927 until 1963 and that they lived on the property along the Road
from 1925 or 1933 (depending upon which sister is considered) until 1949. During that time
Page 4 of 20

tl ieR oadv asti a i eledt ;; the pi lblic often ai id no attempts were made by the family to restrict
or deny access to the Road to any members of the public.

property between 1947 and 1955. Ile also hunted in the area every year until 1965, lie
testified that his father "made arrangement

•. ...... iardner to move sheep across \ i:.

Gardner's property on the way to the forest service propeirty. Defendants insist that this
travel was, therefore, by permission

I lowever.

•.•*. J. ^ son did not participate in the

ilisnissinns jtiidl I NII ill i (unlii \ lim lln ,u iliiuil aiuinp n-.-is w

leceased. It was apparent that

the Gardners had cattle on their property. Care needed to be taken to not allow the sheep to

were just as likely an effort to work out the details of the operation as to gain permission to
travel the Road.
That Duane Newitt, Ron Davis, Renae Swenson, Glen Roberts, Norris Dalton, Youd Barney,
Hugh Tangren, Don Daley, Craig Ingram, and Glen Thatcher, all personally used the kudu
recreation including hunting, fishing, camping, and sightseeing in the 1940fs and 50's.
None of them encountered locked gates on the Road or sought permission to use the Road.

and Hugh Tangren, drove vehicles well into forest service property.
T i l 11 III I'll I
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worse in the wetter times of the year and occasionally restricted travel by vehicle, but not by
foot, horseback, or horse drawn wagon. Winter snow was not plowed off the Road.

Nevertheless, the evidence is clear and convincing that for at least 10 years prior to 1958 the
road was open and traveled by the public as often as necessary or convenient, interrupted
vehicular travel only by naturally occurring conditions such as groundwater (spring water)
in wet years and snow in the winter. The springs and bogs in the Road were passable on
foot, horseback or by wagon even when vehicle access was restricted.
12.

That Defendant Randy Butler and his parents (J. Lee Butler and Diane Butler), defense
witnesses, recalled family hunting trips between 1958 and 1962 when family members
accompanied the family patriarch, Barney Newitt (Diane Butler's father, Randy Butler's
grandfather) to a location in Sanpete County to obtain a key before traveling up the Road to
camp just below the bog on the property now owned by Defendants Blaine and Linda Evans.
Randy Butler has a particularly vivid memory from approximately 1952 when, at age 7, he
saw his grandfather get out of the truck to unlock a gate and spotted a buck which he shot
before opening the gate to allow continued travel on the road. Contrasted against this vivid
and believable recollection, however, is other important evidence. Only the Poulson family
has been identified as property owners who lived in Sanpete County. Barney Newitt and
Grandmother Poulsen, to whom he would have spoken in 1958 to 1962 about a key are both
deceased. Steve Poulson testified that to his knowledge the only locked gate on the Poulson
property during that time was on a side road branching south off the Road toward an old
bunkhouse. Duane Newitt, the brother of Diane Butler, testified that he camped and hunted
with the family during those years and does not recall any locked gates. Nineteen other
witnesses testified that they traveled the Road for a variety of purposes during that time and
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never encountered any locked gates. None of the other witnesses ever felt it necessary to
obtain permission from property owners to travel the Road.
13.

That Virgil Neeves, a defense witness, testified that between 1958 and 1980 there was a
cable gate across a cattle guard west of the Gardner home (the last home traveling west
toward the forest service property, now occupied by Defendants Randy Butler and Donna
Butler) which was locked most of the time. He specifically recalled a "cock fight" up the
Road in 1972 when only people who were supposed to participate were given keys to the
gate. A cock fight, of course, is an illegal activity and the one time use of the gate to
discourage discovery or participation by persons not known to the participants can hardly be
considered to be a termination of general public access. Mr. Neeves' other access to the area
was usually across country from the property he worked to the north (the Dixon Ranch) to
work on water diversion works along Bennie Creek. He saw people stuck on the Road and
recalls a cable across a cattle guard on the Road to stop cars. His memories are simply
confused and inconsistent with all of the other testimony about obstructions on the Road in
question. Further, there is evidence of a cable across a side road belonging to the Poulson
family, and a gate and cattle guard on the Road at the Forest Boundary.

14.

That Mike Condley, a defense witness, testified that he lived in the area from 1970 until
1979. Although he does not recall any locks after 1979, he firmly recalled a locked gate near
the Gardner (Butler) home.

However, no other witness corroborates this point and

descriptions of locked gates by the Butler family, Defendant Blaine Evans and others put
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locked gates farther west, near the present cattle guard between the Butler home and forest
service property.
15.

That Elizabeth Condley, a defense witness, testified that between 1967 and 1977 the gates
were never locked in the summer but that they were locked late in every fall. However, her
testimony was that she traveled the Road on horseback during the summer. There was
nothing given to explain how she could have known that the gate was locked in the fall.

16.

That the heaviest use of the Road was clearly for hunting deer and elk in the fall season.
Several dozen witness testified that they personally hunted the area between 1958 and 1980
and never encountered locked gates or were otherwise prevented from using the Road.
Division of Wildlife Resources officer Gurley and Briggs patrolled the area to check hunters
and fishermen from 1958 through 1996. Dale Gurley, in particular, patrolled between 1968
and 1991 sometimes observing as many as 25 or 30 hunters in the forest service area who
had traveled up the Road to hunt. Officer Gurley never encountered locked gates and never
needed permission to access the area to check on hunters and fishermen. Kent Cornaby,
Forest Service supervisor, routinely traveled the Road during the 60fs and 70's for personal
and professional purposes. Entrance to the forest service during that time was marked by
signs.

17.

That Shirlene Otteson, a Plaintiffs witness, testified that her family purchased the Gardner
property in 1964 and owned it until 1981. During that time she was regularly on the property
with her husband and children. The Road was considered and treated by her family as a
public road during that time. No attempt was made to close the Road during that time.
Page 8 of 20
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There was testimony that one defense witness, John Mendenhall, was told by Mrs. Otteson's
father, Mr. Roach, to stop hunting and leave his property. However, Mr. Mendenhall
testified that he was a teenager with three other teenagers and no adult. Mr. Mendenhall was
hunting well off the Road on the Roach (Gardner/now Butler) property. Ordering teenagers
to leave in such a circumstance hardly equates with restricting travel on the Road.
That there was testimony that the Road is periodically used to deliver irrigation water to
property along the Road and that when that occurs, the Road becomes impassable. However,
neither the Gardner family nor the Otteson (Roach) families used that method of irrigation,
covering a period from 1925-1981. A clear and convincing majority of witnesses further
traveled the Road unrestricted by irrigation practices.
That there was substantial testimony about signs along the Road. The Defendants have
insisted that there were many signs, perpendicular to the Road, coupled with posts painted
yellow and orange clearly designating the area as private property. Most of Plaintiffs'
witnesses testified that they saw the signs but considered them warning against leaving the
Road but not a warning against traveling on the Road. The evidence was that the signs were
placed on various locations along the edge of the Road west of the Gardner home to the
forest boundary and, in particular, around a wire gate in the vicinity of a present cattle guard.
Members of the public encountering signs posting property as provided by Utah Code Ann.
§23-20-14 would have to conclude, based upon Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14, that they were
at a property line or on the edge of private property, meaning that where they are standing
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is not restricted. Signs and painted posts along a fence running parallel to a road, regardless
of the physical juxtaposition of the sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary than
prohibiting travel along the road from which the signs can be seen. The signs and painted
posts in this case clearly did what the Plaintiffs' witnesses assumed, they prohibited travel
off of the Road, not on the Road. There was no testimony that any signs stated "Road
Closed."
20.

That there was testimony regarding four gates on the Road between U.S. Highway 89 and
the Uinta National Forest. Traveling west from the highway, the first gate location is near the
Gardner home (presently the Randy and Donna Butler home). All but one witness described
the versions of this gate prior to 1996 as a drift wire gate that was never locked. All testified
and believed it was used to assist in livestock operations and not to restrict general travel on
the Road.

21.

The second gate to the west was within 100 yards of a present cattle gate. Also a wire gate,
most witnesses did not recall any locks and that the gate was only occasionally closed. These
witnesses believed that, again, the gate was for use with livestock operations and not
intended to restrict travel on the Road. There was also testimony, however, that this gate was
locked on occasion after 1980 and the implication was that this was the gate unlocked by
Barney Newitt in the late 50's and early 60's. Remnants of the gate sill exist, including a
weathered piece of plywood which was brought into court. This evidence is simply too
skimpy and too removed to conclude that the fence was locked and signed to disrupt public
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travel particularly in the face of all the witness who regularly traveled the Road and recalled
no locks or road restrictions.
22.

That there was testimony of a "white gate" constructed of lumber and located near an ancient
bridge spanning one of the ditches or streams crossing the Road. One witness testified that
the gate had been locked on one occasion and one exhibit includes a picture of a yellow pole
described as the remnants of a bridge.

However, again, this minimal evidence is

overwhelmed by the substantial testimony of persons who used and drove the Road in all
seasons between 1925 and 1980 without encountering any locked gate.
23.

The fourth gate is at the entrance to the forest service property, which was formerly a wire
livestock gate, has been replaced with a cattle guard. A metal gate nearby allows horses and
livestock to move through the fence when required. There has been a sign there indicating
the entrance to the forest service for at least 35 years and the forest service property has
clearly been fenced in the memory of all witnesses. A sign, still on the gate, asks users to
"please close the gate."

The sign is presently on the metal gate. The obstruction was

obviously intended to restrict the travel of cattle and sheep, not people.
24.

That the Road connects U.S. Highway 89 and the Uinta National Forest. Paths and trails
from the top or terminus of the Road travel over the mountain and connect to the Nebo Loop
Road.

25.

That during certain seasons and at certain times between 1925 and 1980 there were springs
or ditches which created bogs at times making vehicular or wagon travel through or around
the bogs difficult or impossible. Nevertheless, travel by foot or horse was not restricted and
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there was regular maintenance performed on the Road by Utah County, the United States
Forest Service and landowners during that time. The Road was graded as needed or
following significant storms during the 1950fs. The County has had a contract with the forest
service requiring them to maintain the Road from 1974 through the present time. There was
no evidence that the County has not honored that contract. One witness for the Defense
testified that he operated a grader for the County and only graded from the church to the
Gardner home for several years. Others, however, testified that they graded the Road from
the termination of oiled road in Birdseye to the forest service property at least twice per year
during the decades of the 60fs and 70fs.
26.

That the testimony established a wide variety of uses including travel to the forest service and
adjoining private property for fishing, deer hunting, elk hunting, cougar hunting (during the
winter), hiking, family outings, general sightseeing, labor on irrigation headwaters,
movement of cattle and sheep, law enforcement related to wildlife regulations, and
maintenance of forest trails and signs by forest service employees.

27.

That vehicles, horses, trailers, hikers, bikes and motorcycles all at various times traveled the
entire length of the Road ending on forest service property.

28.

That the Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence that even if it is concluded (which
this Court does not) that the Road was gated and locked in the late 50's and early 60fs as
described by the Butler's, the Road was used as necessary and convenient by the public for
more than 10 years before that time and, again, 10 years after that time.
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That the only testimony as to width of the Road was that of Clyde Naylor, a qualified
engineer and longtime director of public works for Utah County. Mr. Naylor testified that
a width of 20 feet plus a three foot shoulder on each side for a total width of 26 feet was
reasonably necessary for anticipated travel. There being no evidence to the contrary the Court
finds that the width of the roadway in this case should be 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder
on each side.
The Court notes that a legal description of the centerline of the Road generated from a survey
of the Road itself was introduced into evidence. The description was challenged by counsel
for the Defendants since it appears to lie in a different township or range than the legal
description of the Defendants' properties. Testimony was also presented that indicated that
several years ago the adjoining property owners agreed to establish their respective
boundaries as the center of the roadway and confirmed that agreement by recorded boundary
line agreement. No expert testimony was presented to assist this Court to determine if there
is a conflict in the two positions or how such a conflict, if it exists, should be resolved. The
Court merely determines, today, that the Road as it presently exists is a public highway, 20
feet wide with a three foot shoulder on each side.
There was testimony that a locked gate was constructed in 1996 by Mr. Butler. There was
also substantial testimony that many people were unable to travel the Road after that time
without gaining permission or using a key provided by Mr. and Mrs. Butler. However, one
exhibit shows a sign created by the County which allowed travel past the Butler gate,
although admonishing travelers to close the gate and stay on the Road until arriving at the
Page 13 of 20
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forest service. As noted above there have historically been gates across the Road for
purposes unrelated to obstruction of traffic. An unlocked gate is consistent with this pattern
and would not be considered to violate the right-of-way declared today.
32.

That for some of the time since construction of the metal Butler gate in 1997 it has been
locked and the Road has been obstructed and for some of the time it has not. No evidence
was presented to clarify how many of the intervening 2,561 days were days when the Road
was obstructed and how many were not. The Plaintiffs, as the moving party in seeking to
obtain the penalty, had the burden of providing specific evidence of the number of days the
Defendants have been in violation. Merely showing initial service and testimony that
persons were stopped from time to time during the last 6 or 7 years does not meet that
burden. Inasmuch as the Court cannot determine with reasonable precision the number of
days during which a violation of the State statute and County ordinances existed no penalty
can be imposed.

33.

The Road has been a public thoroughfare connecting a national forest and recreation area to
a national roadway for decades and generations.

34.

That Plaintiffs are the prevailing party and are therefore entitled to recover reasonable costs
of court to be established by affidavit.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court hereby makes the following Conclusions of Law relying in whole or in part upon

the foregoing Findings of Fact:
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1.

That the Road has been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public because it has been
continuously used a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §72-5-104 (and its predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89).

2.

That three factors must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order for a route
to be deemed a dedicated highway, abandoned to the use of the public under Utah Code Ann.
§ 72-5-104: "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public thoroughfare, (iii) for a period
often years. ...Once the technical provision of [the statute] have been satisfied, the road is
a 'public highway.' The court has no discretion to ignore that fact." Campbell v. Box Elder
County, 962 P.2d 806 at 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) citing Hebert City Corp. v. Simpson. 942
P.2d 307 at 310 (Utah 1997). That Plaintiffs successfully proved each of the foregoing
factors by clear and convincing evidence.

3.

That there is no requirement of proof of the owner's intent to offer the road to the public.
Bertagnole v. Pine Meadows Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 at 213 (Utah, 1981); see also Draper
City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097 at 1099 (Utah, 1995) and Thurman v. Bvram. 626
P.2d 445 at 449 (Utah 1981).

4.

That continuous use is established where "the public has made a continuous and
uninterrupted use of the road as often as they found it convenient or necessary." Campbell.
962 P.2d at 809. The "use may be continuous though not constant...provided it occurred as
often as the claimant had occasion to choose to pass. Mere intermission is not interruption."
Id at 809 (citing Richards v. Pines Ranch. Inc.. 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977).
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That Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14 provides a mechanism for private property owners to
restrict sportsman access to their property by posting:
"Properly posted" means that "No Trespassing" signs or a minimum of 100
square inches of bright yellow, bright orange, or flourescent paint are
displayed at all corners, fishing streams crossing property lines, roads, gates,
and rights-of-way entering the land. If metal fence posts are used, the entire
exterior side must be painted."
The plain and obvious intent of the statute is to require physical notation or warning at the
entrance or on the edge of property. Members of the public encountering such signs would
have to conclude, based upon the statute, that they were at a property line or on the edge of
private property, meaning that where they are standing is not restricted. Signs and painted
posts along a fence running parallel to a road, regardless of the physical juxtaposition of the
sign, more clearly indicate the fence as a boundary than prohibiting travel along the road
from which the signs can be seen. The signs and painted posts in this case clearly did what
the plaintiffs' witnesses assumed-they prohibited travel off of the road, not on the road.
That the term "thoroughfare" is not defined in any Utah statute. Competent legal authority
defines the term as a "street or way opening at both ends into another street or public
highway, so that one can go through and get out of it without returning. It differs from a cul
de sac, which is open only at one end." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Banks-Baldwin Law
Publishing Company, Cleveland: 1946. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that:
[w]hile it is difficult to fix a standard by which the measure what is a public
use or a public thoroughfare, it can be said here that the road was used by
many and different persons for a variety of purposes; that it was open to all
who desired to use it; that the use made of it was as general and extensive as
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the situation and surroundings would permit, had the road been formally laid
out as a pubic highway by public authority."
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos. 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 at 648 (Utah 1929).
The court has also stated that a "'thoroughfare' is a place or way through which there is
passing or travel. It becomes a 'public thoroughfare' when the public have a general right of
passage." Gilmore v. Carter. 15 U.2d 280, 291 P.2d 426 at 428 (Utah 1964).
In another case evidence that the road was generally impassable, that the road failed to
connect or lead to public property and that there had been only minimal maintenance were
reasons to overturn a determination by summary judgment that a proposed road was a
highway. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097 at 1100-1101 (Utah 1995). Of
course the Draper City case did not determine that the road known as the "Lower Canyon
Corner Road" could not be determined to be a public highway in the face of such evidence,
only that the issue could not be resolved via summary judgment. This case is in a
substantially different posture.
7.

That the Road was a public thoroughfare before 1980.

8.

That having determined that the Road was dedicated and abandoned to the public before
1980 by clear and convincing evidence, this Court must also determine the reasonable and
necessary width of the Road. See Kohler v. Martin. 916 P.2d 910 and 914 (Utah Ct. App.
1996), Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3).

9.

That the reasonable and necessary width of the Road to ensure safe travel is 26 feet,
including a 20 foot wide travel width and three (3) foot shoulders on each side.
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10.

That Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-104 provides that any person who installs, places or maintains
a structure within the right-of-way of a highway must remove the structure within ten days
upon notice. Upon failure to remove the structure "[a] highway authority may recover . ..
. (b) $10 for each day the installation remained within the right-of-way after notice was
complete."

11.

Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable costs of court as the prevailing party to be established by
affidavit.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ordered,

adjudged, and decreed as follows:
1.

That the Road from the gate at the Butler residence to the Uinta National Forest Boundary
is hereby declared a public highway within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104 (and
its predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89).

2.

That the location of Road is where it presently exists.

3.

That the scope (or width) of the right-of-way of the Road west of the gate at the Butler
Residence is 26 feet, including a 3 foot shoulder on each side and a 20 foot travel width, the
centerline of which is the center of the exiting Bennie Creek Road.

4.

That the Defendants and their successors and assigns shall not take any action that blocks,
locks, or otherwise interferes with public access to the Road.

5.

That the Defendants immediately remove any and all structures, blockages, gates, fences or
anything that blocks, locks, or otherwise interferes with public access across the Road.
Page 18 of 20

nnifinq

6.

That Plaintiff Utah County's request for judgment, joint and several, against Defendants
Randy Butler and Donna Butler at the rate of $10 per day from July 29, 1997 to the date of
the order, plus interest at the legal rate from the date of judgment is hereby denied.

7.

That Plaintiffs are>awarded judgment, joint and several, against Defendants Randy Butler and
Donna Butter, Blaine and Linda Evans for reasonable costs of courtdetermined by a verified

^

n4

bill of costs pursuant to URCP Rule 54 in the amount of $

<*>^
8.

and $

for Utah County

for the State of Utah.

Plaintiff Utah County is ordered to record this Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order in the records of the Utah County Recorder.

9.

For interest on the Judgement at the legal rate from date of the entry of judgment.
DATED this / (p day of

Notice of objections must be submitted to the Court an<H^9aaa^*within five (5) days after
service, pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER, postage prepaid, t h i s / ^ d a y off

ll<M(J^ . 2004,

to the following:

,j

MARKE. ARNOLD
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
57 West 200 South #105
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
MARTIN B. BUSHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
1594 West North Temple, Suite 2110
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

/
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SCOTT L WIGGINS (582 0)
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C.
American Plaza II, Suite 105
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone:
(801) 328-4333
Facsimile:
(801) 328-2405
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Attorneys for Defendants / Appellants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY and STATE OF UTAH,
by and through its DEPARTMENT
OF NATURAL RESOURCES, DIVISION
OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES,
Plaintiffs / Appellees,

)
)
)
)

v.

)

RANDY BUTLER, DONNA BUTLER,
MARGARET CONDLEY, ELIZABETH
CONDLEY, BLAINE EVANS, LINDA
EVANS, and JOHN DOES 1-15,

)
)
)
)

Defendants / Appellants.

Case No. 000403372
Division No. 7

)

Judge James R. Taylor

NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Randy Butler, Donna Butler,
Blaine Evans, and Linda Evans, by and through counsel, Scott L
Wiggins, of and for Arnold & Wiggins, P . C , hereby appeals to the
Utah Supreme Court from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,

oni«oo

and Order of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah, Utah
County, the Honorable James R. Taylor, presiding, which was
signed by the district court on August 16, 2004, and entered that
same day.
DATED this 15th day of September, 2004.
INS, P.C.

fendants /
Appellants

! CERTIFY THAT THIS 3 A TRUE COPY OF
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT OJNifilL&IN THE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DiSTF
COUNTY, STATE OF UTA£
DATE:

^M&**§*
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, being duly sworn, state that I, as
appellate counsel for Defendants Randy Butler, Donna Butler,
Blaine Evans, and Linda Evans, served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL upon the parties listed below by
placing the same in an envelope addressed to:
Mr. M. Cort Griffin
Mr. Robert J. Moore
Deputy Utah County Attorneys
100 East Center Street, Suite 2400
Provo, UT 84 606

Counsel

for

Utah

County

Mr. Martin B. Bushman
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office
1594 West North Temple, Suite 2110
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Counsel for State
Natural Resources,
Resources

of Utah,
Division

Department
of
of
Wildlife

and causing the same to be mailed First Class, postage prepaid,
on the 15th of September, 2004.

STATE O F

UTAH
ss .

C O U N T Y OF SALT L A K E

)

P e r s o n a l l y a p p e a r e d b e f o r e m e S C O T T L W I G G I N S a n d s i g n e d the
f o r e g o i n g A F F I D A V I T O F SERVICE o n t h i s jfT d a y of S e p t e m b e r ,
2004.

" "Notary Public""" H i

CYDNIEKAESAMORA.
_

Li^

919 North Cathwkw Street
8alt Lake Ctty, Utah 84116
MyCommfeaionExplfte
January 30» 2006
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